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ESSAY 
THE COST OF NOVELTY 
W. Nicholson Price II*  
Patent law tries to spur the development of new and better innova-
tive technology. But it focuses much more on “new” than “better”—and 
it turns out that “new” carries real social costs. I argue that patent law 
promotes innovation that diverges from existing technology, either a little 
(what I call “differentiating innovation”) or a lot (“exploring innova-
tion”), at the expense of innovation that tells us more about existing 
technology (“deepening innovation”). Patent law’s focus on newness is 
unsurprising, and fits within a well-told narrative of innovative diversity 
accompanied by market selection of the best technologies. Unfortunately, 
innovative diversity brings not only the potential benefits of technological 
advances but also the costs: incompatibility between different technolo-
gies; a spread-out, shallow pool of knowledge; and the underlying costs 
of developing parallel technologies that aren’t actually better. These costs 
matter. 
Biomedical innovation illustrates the high costs of divergence. Al-
though pharmaceuticals are touted as a poster child for patents, the world 
is rife with me-too drugs that drive up costs with little to show for it. 
Biomedical innovation often suffers from a particular trap: Patent incen-
tives push innovators toward “new,” but incentives from Food and Drug 
Administration approval and insurer reimbursement push innovators 
toward “not too new.” In this space, artificially constricted markets do a 
poor job of selecting better technologies. The result is a proliferation of 
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technologies that are “new for the sake of new,” giving us the costs of 
divergence without much in the way of benefits. 
This Essay presents an original spectrum of innovative divergence, 
illuminates how various patent doctrines drive divergence, and lays out 
the substantial costs of divergence through biomedical examples. It 
analyzes the complex interactions between three different incentives for 
biomedical innovation and presents policy prescriptions to help avoid the 
trap of “new for the sake of new.” In the process, it lays out how innova-
tion scholars and policymakers alike should take into account the cost of 
novelty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law promotes innovations that are different from what the 
world already knows. This may seem a truism: What is innovation other 
than the search for new things?1 But mere novelty is not the aim of innova-
tion policy—improvement is. Put more plainly, what we want is “better”; 
what we get is “new.” Often, in fact, we get innovations that are new purely 
for the sake of being new, and not better at all. Sometimes they are worse. 
This Essay explores how patent law promotes what I call divergent innova-
tion—innovation that develops significant or minor changes to existing 
technology rather than learning more about that technology—drawing 
from examples in the field of biomedical innovation. 
Patent law can drive divergent innovation even when other incentives 
suggest focusing on developing an older technology. Known drugs provide 
a useful case. If a known chemical would make an effective drug, compa-
nies typically still won’t develop it, because it isn’t new, and therefore, isn’t 
patentable.2 Instead, they may make minor changes (or seek out a totally 
different chemical), even if those changes might make the drug worse, 
because the patent incentive is so important to the innovative process.3 
Patent doctrines focus incentives on the search for new and different 
innovation without emphasizing improving technology or increasing wel-
fare. Novelty, nonobviousness, and utility doctrines all drive innovations’ 
newness when innovators seek patent protection.4 And in a mirror image 
of patent incentives to create new innovations, innovators “invent around” 
 
 1. Innovation policy scholars often distinguish invention—the process of creating a 
new technology—from innovation—the process of commercializing a new invention. See, 
e.g., Yale Brozen, Invention, Innovation, and Imitation, 41 Am. Econ. Rev. 239, 239 (1951). 
I use innovation here to describe the entire process, assuming a unified innovator whose 
inventive and commercialization efforts are driven by a desire to profit from the innovation. 
 2. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87 
Tex. L. Rev. 503, 513 (2009) [hereinafter Roin, Unpatentable Drugs] (“[I]t is well known 
that pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop new drugs unless they have 
strong patent protections over them.”); infra section II.A.1. New use patents may be available 
but provide relatively weak incentives. See infra section II.A.1; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 717, 724–25 (2005) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg, New Uses] (describing the limited incentives provided by new use patents); Erika 
Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 168, 182–95 (2018) 
(arguing that protections for new uses are inadequate). 
 3. See infra section III.A. 
 4. While the title of this Essay refers to “novelty,” it addresses newness in general, not 
just the novelty doctrine of patent law. 
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patents on existing technology not because inventing around will improve 
a product but to avoid the cost imposed by existing patents.5 
Divergent innovation may bring benefits, but it also brings costs that 
differ from the cost of patent exclusivity itself. I identify three here. First, 
the process of inventing around existing patents is itself costly. To develop 
a new drug similar to an existing drug, the developer needs to undergo 
the entire process of preclinical work, clinical trials, and Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, at a cost of many millions of dollars. 
Second, divergent innovation can lead to incompatible technologies, the 
absence of standards, and the loss of network effects and economies of 
scale. Third, when the path of innovation is deliberately forked, we lose 
the ability to draw from existing stocks of knowledge about a particular 
technology because the new technology is different for the sake of being 
different. Those new clinical trials mean that we know less about both the 
new drug and the old drug than we would have known if we had simply 
developed more knowledge about the old drug. Even when divergent 
innovation effectively moves technology forward, the costs of divergent 
innovation should be weighed against its benefits.6 
The costs of divergent innovation have gone understudied partly 
because divergence fits so neatly within a patent-driven market theory of 
innovation. Patent law relies on the market to sort out the value of inven-
tions. Patents are only worthwhile if the protected goods are valuable in 
the marketplace, so the market will work to sort out the valuable innova-
tions from a mélange of patented inventions.7 As John Duffy puts it, 
“[P]atent law has no aversion to awarding commercially worthless prop-
erty rights.”8 But firms, with their private knowledge about markets and 
consumers, can predict market value (to some extent), and use that infor-
mation to drive their innovation investment decisions. Under this account, 
while patent law does not require superiority for individual inventions,9 
patent law and markets together should lead to overall improvements over 
time. 
Unfortunately, markets aren’t always great at identifying innovating 
improvements. Consumers select goods for many reasons besides quality.10 
 
 5. See infra section III.B. 
 6. Patent law creates these costs by prioritizing divergent innovation, as I argue here, 
but these costs are not dependent on patent law; if a grant system or prize system similarly 
promoted technological divergence, the same sorts of divergence costs would arise. 
 7. Note that while patent law permits the patenting of useless new things, see infra 
section II.A.3, it does not permit the patenting of useful old things, see infra section II.A.1. 
 8. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 
453 (2004). 
 9. See infra section II.A.3. 
 10. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Placebo Marks, 47 Pepp. L. Rev. 45, 53–62 (2019) 
(explaining how trademarks can drive economically irrational consumer behavior but can 
also alter consumer experience of the branded product); Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 
74 Ohio St. L.J. 241, 264–66 (2013) (describing how brand names can contribute to con-
sumers’ hedonic experiences of goods). For additional information, see generally Deborah 
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We might therefore expect the costs of divergence—the source of the 
variety from which markets pick the winners—to be more problematic 
where market mechanisms do a poor job of incentivizing, selecting, and 
adopting superior innovations. 
Markets are especially bad at selecting superior biomedical technolo-
gies. Efficient markets require informed consumers who can choose goods. 
But biomedical technologies, which make up a trillion-dollar annual in-
dustry with tremendous health implications, are often “credence goods,” 
meaning that their users cannot evaluate the innovations’ quality inde-
pendently.11 Even with FDA regulation, information about biomedical 
technologies’ quality is frequently poor or unavailable.12 Finally, patients, 
doctors, and insurers split the consumer functions of selecting, paying for, 
and benefiting from goods, each with their own incentives. Since market 
mechanisms for selecting superior technologies underperform for bio-
medical innovations, the costs of divergent innovation matter more. These 
costs are particularly significant because biomedical technology encom-
passes drugs, which are presented as the exemplar of an industry where 
patents are truly important and work as designed.13 
Patents create incentives within a broader innovation ecosystem, 
where some policy tools, like patents, promote divergence, but others dis-
courage innovators from diverging. For biomedical technology, consider 
two among many:14 Market approval by FDA and health insurer reimburse-
ment decisions each create substantial innovation incentives. Each can 
penalize divergence. At FDA, specialized processes ease market access for 
new medical devices that resemble existing devices; if the technology is 
substantially different, getting premarket approval can be much harder.15 
Similarly, winning insurer reimbursement for a new technology is easier if 
the insurer is familiar with the technology, such that the innovator need 
not make their case from scratch.16 The interaction between these incentive 
 
J. MacInnis, C. Whan Park & Joseph R. Priester, Handbook of Brand Relationships (2019) 
(describing relationships between consumers and brands). 
 11. Ariel Dora Stern, Innovation Under Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Medical 
Technology, 145 J. Pub. Econ. 181, 182 (2017). The nature of health technology as a cre-
dence good, among other factors, drives the need for FDA regulation. See id. at 183–84; see 
also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 26–29 (1982) (using drugs as an example 
to argue that information failures can justify regulation). 
 12. See infra section III.D.2. 
 13. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 504. 
 14. Other levers could and should be considered in future work. Prestigious journals, 
for instance, prioritize novel, surprising results over confirmations or refinements of exist-
ing work; government grants may go either to new research pathways or to existing areas 
with which grant reviewers are comfortable. See generally John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most 
Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS Med. 696 (2005) (discussing publication 
incentives); W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Price, 
Grants] (discussing grant incentives). 
 15. See infra section IV.A. 
 16. See infra section IV.B. 
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systems can lead to bad outcomes: Patent incentives pushing for newness 
can be partially counterbalanced by reimbursement and regulatory incen-
tives pushing against too much newness, resulting in a spate of technolo-
gies that are different enough to bring the costs of divergence, without 
being sufficiently different to bring substantial benefits. 
Good innovation policy depends on understanding innovation, and 
the costs of divergence are a part of that. This Essay makes a general claim: 
Patent law drives divergent innovation, and that divergence carries costs. 
As to this picture of innovation in general, the only prescription I offer is 
that scholars and policymakers take divergence costs into account when 
analyzing innovation incentives, benefits, and costs. 
This Essay also makes a specific claim: Divergence is especially costly 
for biomedical innovations, which patents and other incentives can drive 
toward an unhappy medium of differentiating, proliferating, nonsuperior 
technologies. This specific problem may be amenable to solutions. Within 
patent law, strengthening the nonobviousness requirement could reduce 
close imitators of existing technology. Outside patent law, FDA or insurer 
requirements for superiority could do the same. 
This Essay proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the ways in which 
innovation paths can diverge or not. Part II lays out how several patent 
doctrines can drive divergent innovation. Part III provides three cases to 
illustrate divergent innovation and the costs it can bring: me-too drugs, 
including statins; insulin pumps for diabetics; and epinephrine auto-
injectors like the EpiPen. Part IV places patent law into a broader context 
in the case of biomedical innovation, addressing how the incentives pro-
vided by FDA approval and insurer reimbursement can drive innovation 
to follow the path of existing technology. It also considers how these 
combined incentives can perversely lead to innovation landing in an 
unhappy middle: close enough to existing technology that we derive little 
social benefit from diversity but far enough from that technology that we 
see the costs of divergence. Part V describes potential solutions to the 
problems specific to biomedical innovation, located either within or 
outside patent doctrine. 
I. DEGREES OF DIVERGENT INNOVATION 
Consider the cases of three potential innovators. 
Jenn heads a firm focused on allergy medications.17 She wants to 
improve the field of epinephrine (a.k.a. adrenaline) auto-injectors that are 
used in emergencies by patients with severe allergies, a field currently 
 
 17. Firm size and composition affect innovation efforts. See generally Dan L. Burk, 
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (2004) (discussing the interactions 
between intellectual property and theories of the firm). I set aside these fascinating issues 
here, assuming innovators face similar firm structures. Adding firm complexities would, of 
course, further complicate the picture. 
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dominated by the EpiPen.18 The EpiPen saves lives, but user error causes 
problems: Sometimes people get the ends mixed up and inject the epi-
nephrine into their thumbs when they’re trying to use the device.19 It’s also 
currently mired in scandal because its price has quadrupled over seven 
years.20 Jenn considers three possible options. She can try to develop a 
more efficient manufacturing process for the EpiPen with the goal of 
lowering its price. She can try to make a new auto-injector that’s essentially 
the same as the EpiPen but just a little different—perhaps it has two safety 
caps where the EpiPen has one. Or she can try to make something that’s 
quite different—a different overall design to reduce the risk of thumb-
sticking, and perhaps other substantial changes. 
Michelle runs a drug company with expertise in statins, drugs used to 
reduce high cholesterol. She can choose to develop new information about 
an existing blockbuster statin, Lipitor, identifying new dosing regimens or 
new data about effects in different populations. She can try to develop 
another statin that reduces high cholesterol. Or she can pursue some new 
anticholesterol drug target. 
Finally, Martin runs a medical device company. He is developing a new 
line of insulin pumps and is considering what connector to use to link the 
pumps to insulin reservoirs. He can use the existing, industry-standard 
technology, incorporating it into the new line. He can tweak the existing 
technology to work slightly better for the new line. Or he can develop a 
new connector designed specifically for the new line of pumps. 
We can think of the three options faced by innovators as, roughly, 
learning more about the existing technology (“deepening”), pursuing 
minor variations on the existing technology (“differentiating”), or moving 
further afield from the existing technology toward something markedly 
different (“exploring”).21 The latter two are forms of divergent innovation. 
In differentiating innovation, an invention can be trivially different from 
what came before, perhaps just “new for the sake of new.” In exploring 
innovation, inventions take a larger step away from what came before. 
Either change may be good or bad; the size of the change says nothing 
about whether it is an improvement, a worsening, or neither. 
 
 
 
 
 
 18. See infra section III.D.1. 
 19. Ceara McNeil & Julie Copeland, Accidental Digital Epinephrine Injection: To Treat 
or Not to Treat?, 60 Canadian Fam. Physician 726, 726 (2014). 
 20. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story: How Mylan 
Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 Cornell L. Rev. Online 53, 53 (2017). 
 21. See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: DIFFERENT POTENTIAL INNOVATIONS 
 Nondivergent Divergent 
Deepening Differentiating Exploring 
Allergies Improve EpiPen 
manufacturing 
Slightly 
modify EpiPen 
Develop a new form-
factor auto-injector 
Statins Identify new Lipitor 
dosing regimen 
Develop a new 
statin 
Pursue a different 
anti-cholesterol drug 
Insulin Adopt the existing 
connector 
Tweak the 
connector 
Develop a new 
connector 
This typology of innovation divergence sits to some degree at the 
intersection of broad literatures on cumulative innovation and product 
differentiation. Cumulative innovation is the process by which innovation 
builds on earlier innovation; Suzanne Scotchmer and others have ex-
plored patent law’s impact on cumulative innovation in some depth.22 
Product differentiation, on the other hand, focuses on the various ways 
that firms differentiate their products for consumers, whether based on 
quality, branding, price, or otherwise.23 Although I borrow insights from 
each field throughout this Essay, I ultimately do not adopt either’s frame-
work. Instead, I focus on the ways that a new technology can differ from 
older technology, the degrees of those differences, and how patent law and 
other incentives interact with the process of divergent innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 30–40 (1991) (modeling cumulative inno-
vation and patent law’s impact on it); see also, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold 
& Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1, 57–58 (2017) (describing the incentives of creators to “build on” versus “build around” 
prior intellectual property and discussing the difference between “tweaking” and “pioneer-
ing” innovation); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical 
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 838–44 (2001) 
(describing how patents and antitrust can help or hinder cumulative innovation). 
 23. See, e.g., Erin Parrish, Retailers’ Use of Niche Marketing in Product Development, 
14 J. Fashion Marketing & Mgmt. 546, 546–47 (2010) (describing methods of product differ-
entiation and their benefits to industry). 
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FIGURE 1: DEEPENING, DIFFERENTIATING, AND EXPLORING INNOVATION 
Deepening, differentiating, and exploring innovation are not sharply 
delineated, nor will any particular innovation fit neatly into only one cate-
gory.24 The boundary between differentiating and exploring innovation is 
often particularly fuzzy; these are labels along a spectrum of divergence 
rather than distinct classes. Exploring or differentiating innovation can 
also lead to increased knowledge about the existing technology: When you 
try to change a product substantially, you may learn more about how it 
works now, and when you make minor variations, you might learn more 
about how to manufacture it. Nevertheless, these three general classes can 
help us think about the types of innovation that innovators might pursue. 
In each of the three cases described above, any of the options could 
be best for social welfare.25 Society might be better off with more cheaply 
manufactured EpiPens, better information about how Lipitor works, or 
increased adoption of the insulin pump interface (deepening). But it 
might just as well be better off getting a really different epinephrine auto-
injector, a new drug in a new class, or a connector that is more secure 
(exploring). In the middle (differentiating), society might benefit from 
small variations in existing technology through, for instance, increased 
competition or small improvements. To the extent that differentiating and 
exploring innovation both bring the costs discussed in Part III, one might 
expect that deepening innovation (which doesn’t have those costs) and 
exploring innovation (which has the potential for bigger performance 
breakthroughs) will often be more desirable than differentiating innova-
tion, but that conclusion is certainly not a given in any instance. Specific 
answers will involve tradeoffs between knowledge breadth and depth, inter-
operability and improvements, competition and differentiation, and other 
values. Finding the right answer won’t always be straightforward. 
But patent law has a favorite answer. Patent law creates incentives for 
innovators to pursue pathways that are different from what has come 
before, whether differentiating or exploring. Its various doctrines make 
 
 24. See supra Figure 1. 
 25. It would be nice to have all these innovations, of course, but I assume limited 
innovator resources. 
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patents available only for new inventions and substantially limit patents’ 
ability to promote developing new information about old inventions.26 In 
addition, the exclusivity created by earlier patents limits the ability of later 
inventors to practice the earlier invention without paying a license or fac-
ing the risk of infringement liability.27 Thus, innovators choosing between 
different possible forms of innovation will be driven, at least by patent law, 
to pursue paths diverging from existing knowledge. 
Patent law’s preference for novelty exists even when we do know what’s 
socially best, and even when it’s not a divergent path. Jenn may be certain 
(and right) that auto-injectors will be best advanced by improving EpiPen 
manufacturing. Or Martin may be certain (and right) that new proprietary 
connectors would create negative effects by locking consumers into exist-
ing platforms, and that these negative effects would swamp the benefits 
from most technological advances.28 And the all-too-common failure of 
scientific results to hold up over time suggests that simply replicating exist-
ing studies—perhaps the most straightforward form of deepening innova-
tion—would substantially benefit society.29 Patent law will nevertheless 
create incentives to pursue the divergent path.30 The next section explores 
the purpose of patent law and the doctrines by which it creates incentives 
for divergent innovation. 
 
 26. See infra section II.A. 
 27. See infra section II.B. 
 28. Cf. Melissa A. Schilling, Technological Lockout: An Integrative Model of the Economic 
and Strategic Factors Driving Technology Success and Failure, 23 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 267, 
267–69 (1998) (explaining how “technological lockout” occurs (1) when firms “produce[] 
products representing or conforming to a technological standard that is subsequently 
rejected by the market” and (2) when “there is an existing dominant design and the firm is 
unable to . . . produc[e] or sell[] products conforming to this standard”). 
 29. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 Duke L.J. 845, 882–
902 (2017) [hereinafter Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox] (describing the failure of many 
patented drugs to actually work in practice). 
 30. Many other incentives also apply. For FDA approval and reimbursement, especially 
relevant in biomedical innovation, see infra Part IV. Patent law itself may not be the dom-
inant form of incentive for technology, especially in an academic context. See generally, e.g., 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996) (describing inno-
vation incentives in government-sponsored research); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 289–
91 (2003) (describing the erosion of open science norms after the Bayh–Dole Act); Arti 
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999) (describing the tension between scientific norms and 
intellectual property’s exclusivity mechanism). Patent law’s incentives are also substantially 
different in the software space. See generally, Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope 
and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001) (providing an overview of 
this space); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation 
Incentives, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1115, 1137–41 (2015) (describing limits on software patents 
and the availability of other incentives). 
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II. HOW PATENT LAW PROMOTES DIVERGENT INNOVATION 
Patent law aims to promote innovation. The Constitution authorizes 
Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by secur-
ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.”31 But what does this mean? What are 
patents really supposed to do? 
Four major theories justify patent law.32 Incentive theory—by far the 
dominant theory—responds to the status of new, costly ideas as public 
goods33 on which competitors can free-ride.34 Firms want to make money; 
why invest in innovation if competitors can swoop in and compete without 
making that costly initial investment? Incentive theory argues that patents 
can provide exclusivity, allowing innovators to reap supracompetitive mar-
ket returns and creating ex ante incentives to innovate.35 Disclosure theory 
takes as a given that innovation will happen but offers patents as a reward 
to innovators to share their inventions with the world rather than keeping 
them secret.36 Commercialization theory argues that patents induce com-
panies to expend the effort to take inventions from early stages to commer-
cial products.37 Finally, prospect theory argues that patents, especially early 
patents, enable initial innovators to orchestrate the many efforts to devel-
op later innovative products from that initial innovation.38 Each theory has 
received substantial criticism39 and different theories appear to predominate 
 
 31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 32. See, e.g., Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the 
Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031, 1033 (1998). 
 33. Public goods are nonrivalrous (I can possess your idea without diminishing your 
possession of the idea) and nonexcludable (once an idea is available, it’s hard to keep others 
from knowing/using it). See, e.g., Molly McLure Wasko, Robin Teigland & Samer Faraj, The 
Provision of Online Public Goods: Examining Social Structure in an Electronic Network of 
Practice, 47 Decision Support Sys. 254, 255 (2009) (defining public goods). 
 34. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights 
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1024–25 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Progress 
of Science] (describing free-riding by competitors). 
 35. Id. at 1024–26 (describing the incentive theory of patents). 
 36. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 551 (2009); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 545, 556–57 
(2012) [hereinafter Ouellette, Useful Information]. 
 37. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (2000) (describing commercialization theory); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341 (2010) (proposing a new type of patent fo-
cused on commercialization). 
 38. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. Econ. 265 (1977) (proposing prospect theory). 
 39. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 135–41 (2004) (critiquing the commercialization and pro-
spect theories); Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 32, at 1037 (noting the dearth of empirical 
evidence for any theory except the incentive theory); Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents 
Affect Research Investments?, 9 Ann. Rev. Econ. 441, 448–56 (2017) (noting that empirical 
evidence on the incentive theory remains unclear). 
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in different contexts.40 All the theories, however, share the aim of promot-
ing the “progress of science and useful arts” by helping innovators develop 
new, better technologies. Nevertheless, because it is hard to identify “bet-
ter” technologies in advance, the identification of better technologies 
typically comes about ex post, through market selection of technologies, 
and ex ante, through firms selecting which innovations to pursue based 
on private knowledge about market preferences.41 
Patent law, like all forms of IP law, aims to promote innovation but 
does not create incentives for all forms of innovative knowledge that we 
value, nor for all forms of innovation that suffer from public goods prob-
lems.42 Market value, on which IP law relies, systematically values some 
goods differently than a social planner or a committee of scientists might,43 
and some types of market-valued innovation are difficult to protect and 
therefore incentivize. Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed cut across patent-
justification theories to point out that patent law promotes only innova-
tion that can be protected through patent law’s excludability mechanism; 
 
 40. For instance, the Bayh–Dole Act, which allows universities to patent federally fund-
ed inventions, was expressly motivated by commercialization and development theory. See 
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 32, at 1040–41 (noting the incompatibility of the Bayh–Dole 
Act with an incentive theory of patents). 
 41. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Innovation System?, 2 Innovation Pol’y & Econ. 51, 54–56 (2002) (noting the preferability 
of patents when private firms have information about market preferences); Daniel J. Hemel 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 327 
(2013) [hereinafter Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Debate] (noting patents’ function of 
aggregating private information about demand for innovations). 
 42. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection 
of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1895–1900 (1990) (describing copyright’s 
rejection of “sweat of the brow” as sufficient justification for authorship); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural 
Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 338–41 (1992) (same); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at 41–
63 (discussing gaps in IP incentives that can be addressed through the grant system); Jerome 
H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 
51, 61–63 (1997) (describing how IP law does provide useful protections for data); cf. Jessica 
Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property 10–11 
(2014) (describing how intellectual property does not account for things that creators 
actually need). For applications to biomedical innovation, see, e.g., Eisenberg, New Uses, 
supra note 2, at 717–20 (describing inadequate incentives to find new uses for drugs); W. 
Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1401, 
1406–07 (2016) (discussing the absence of intellectual property protection for health data—
aside from trade secrecy—and the problems that absence creates); Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 297, 302–04 (2018) (discussing the inadequate incentives pro-
vided by IP to invest in modern cancer research). 
 43. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970, 999–1000 (2012) (explaining how IP’s focus on 
price prevents it from encouraging distributive justice); see also, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, State 
Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. Kan. L. Rev. 487, 509–10 
(2013) (arguing for state agency valuation of innovation); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at 
63–64 (“[T]he aggregation of scientific knowledge and priorities—with input from the gov-
ernment as to social benefit—is not inferior to determinations that arise from private market 
aggregation of private knowledge; it’s just different.”). 
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nonexcludable innovation, like negative information or efficiency check-
lists, receives few patent incentives.44 This Essay takes a similar cross-cutting 
tack: Much as patent law’s excludability mechanism promotes the pro-
duction of excludable knowledge, its focus on difference promotes the 
development of divergent innovation rather than deepening innovation 
that increases knowledge about existing products. 
Patent law and policy are explicit about promoting divergent inno-
vation. The former Chairman of the Department of Commerce’s Patent 
Survey Committee elaborated this goal of divergence in testimony before 
Congress: 
The effect of the patent system . . . is to force diversity. A is a 
manufacturer of can openers; B is a competitor. B comes along 
with a new type of can opener. He gets a patent on it. A can’t copy 
it, but he still has to stay in the can-opener business, so he gets 
busy and gets himself up some new type of can opener, and it is 
usually a little better than B’s.45 
Of course, this example assumes that a consumer can tell that the new can 
opener is better, so that markets can help drive progress—an assumption 
that often does not hold true, especially for biomedical products.46 
Patent law creates incentives for divergent innovation in two principal 
ways. First, patentability doctrines demand difference; an inventor can pa-
tent their invention only if it is novel and nonobvious.47 To the extent that 
patents increase the amount of an invention’s value appropriable by the 
inventor,48 this will increase the realizable value of inventions that diverge 
from what has come before. Utility doctrine also plays a role, not by driving 
divergence but by failing to require improvements. Second, difference can 
shield later inventors from needing to pay earlier inventors for infringe-
ment.49 Patents grant exclusionary rights; if later inventions fall within the 
scope of existing patents covering earlier inventions, the later inventor 
must either license the earlier patent or run the risk of infringement liabil-
ity.50 Innovators who diverge from earlier inventors may be able to avoid 
these costs.51 
 
 44. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of 
Patents, 122 Yale L.J. 1900, 1903–06 (2013). 
 45. Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearings on S. 1717 Before the Spec. Comm. on Atomic 
Energy, 79th Cong. 61 (1946) (statement of William H. Davis, Former Director, Office of 
Economic Stabilization, and Former Chairman, War Labor Board). 
 46. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 34, at 1024–26 (describing how 
patents increase the appropriability of inventions’ value). 
 49. See Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 29–30. 
 50. See id. at 30–32. The later inventor may still be able to obtain a patent on the later 
invention, in which case each patentee could prevent the other from using the later tech-
nology until the first patent expired. 
 51. See id. 
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A. Patentability 
Three patentability doctrines promote divergent innovation.52 The 
most straightforward are the novelty and nonobviousness requirements, 
which enshrine patent law’s push toward what is new and different. How-
ever, the utility requirement also plays a substantial role based on what it 
does not do: require that a new invention be better. 
1. Novelty. — The novelty requirement explicitly requires divergence. 
To be patentable, an invention must be new.53 More precisely, an inven-
tion cannot be patented if every element of the invention can be found 
within a single prior art reference.54 Patent law creates a broad set of 
references known as the “prior art”—essentially, all printed publications, 
patents, patent applications, and things that were publicly used or on sale 
prior to the date the patent was filed.55 If any single reference within that 
set contains every element of the invention claimed in the new patent, the 
patent is “anticipated” and cannot be granted (or, if already granted, is 
invalid).56 If an innovator wants to patent an invention, they must create 
something new. Of course this is unsurprising; a principal purpose of patent 
 
 52. Not all patent doctrines promote divergent innovation and not all doctrines cut 
clearly in one direction or another. The various disclosure doctrines (enablement, written 
description, and definiteness) arguably play minor roles in shaping innovation divergence 
as well but do not cut definitively either for or against divergence. For instance, disclosure 
requirements may promote divergence during the term of the patent, especially when fuzzy 
claim drafting or voluminous specifications lay out broad and unclear barriers for future 
inventors to avoid. See Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 925, 936–39 (2018) 
(describing fuzzy claims, the difficulties of running patent searches, and the costs of drafting 
around); Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 727–28 (2019) (pro-
viding summary statistics of voluminous specifications in chemical and biological patents). 
To the extent that satisfying enablement is easier when new inventions are closer to existing 
inventions, it should promote differentiating over exploring innovation. However, once pa-
tents have expired, the enablement doctrine should make it easier to replicate a patented 
invention or engage in deepening innovation; this should also be true during the patent 
term but is counterbalanced by the exclusionary force of the patent itself. Finally, the very 
fact that the patent term is limited promotes novelty; an innovative monopolist who wishes 
to remain a monopolist needs to develop new products as patents expire. See infra section 
III.B.2 (discussing pharmaceutical evergreening). This Essay focuses on those doctrines 
principally involved in pushing innovation in divergent directions during the patent term. 
 53. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). To be sure, patents are explicitly available on improve-
ments of existing processes or products. But as described in more detail below, those im-
provements, if made to a process or product covered by an existing patent, will face costs in 
the form of licensing requirements or the likelihood of liability for infringement. See infra 
section II.B. 
 54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 55. Id. The exact timing and contours of the prior art are complex but need not con-
cern us here. 
 56. Id.; see also W.L. & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“Anticipation requires the disclosure in a single prior art reference of each element 
of the claim under consideration.”). For a useful analysis of novelty doctrine with respect to 
pharmaceuticals, see generally Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 Duke 
L.J. 919 (2011) (describing the doctrine, arguing that disclosure of chemicals without more 
should not suffice to be an anticipatory disclosure, and arguing for a new framework). 
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law is to drive the creation and sharing of new ideas.57 Under disclosure 
theory, the public should suffer the deadweight loss of monopoly only in 
exchange for information it did not have before;58 under incentive theory, 
innovators need incentives only to develop new technologies, not technol-
ogies that already exist.59 
Novelty also reduces incentives for deepening innovation. Informa-
tion about new uses of a known product, or new results of existing processes, 
will not make that known product or existing process patentable, although 
the new use may itself be patentable.60 Understanding more about an exist-
ing process or product—for example, how mixing water with a drug may 
avoid toxic explosions61 or the usefulness of a subset of known alloys in 
resisting corrosion62—may be tremendously socially valuable. But later 
innovators have limited incentives to discover that information. There are 
two caveats to this story: incentives for the initial innovator and the possi-
bility of patents on new uses or improvements. 
a. Incentives for the Initial Innovator. — The mechanics of novelty 
create different incentives for initial inventors than for later inventors. 
Patents create a largely “winner-take-all” system, in which the first inventor 
to patent an invention reaps most of the reward.63 This system is embodied 
in the novelty requirement: Once one inventor has won the race to the 
patent office, other inventors lose the incentive of market exclusivity.64 This 
creates incentives for other inventors to pursue different paths and de-
creases incentives for those inventors to develop socially valuable informa-
tion about the invention.65 
However, a winner-take-all system also gives the initial inventor assur-
ance that they can capture at least some gains from additional investment 
 
 57. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 34, at 1024. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 1028–30. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 1024–26. 
 60. Patent law permits inventors to patent the use of an old process to a new end—that 
is, to accomplish a new goal—but not the use of a known process toward the same end, even 
if the results were previously unrecognized. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 
Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Newly discovered results of known processes 
directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”). 
 61. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 62. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780–82 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 63. Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, On the Winner-Take-All Principle in Innovation 
Races, 8 J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n 1133, 1133 (2010). 
 64. For a sampling of the extensive literature on patent racing, see generally, e.g.,  Duffy, 
supra note 8, at 443–45 (arguing that racing may dissipate private rents but may increase 
social value because patents filed earlier expire earlier and thus leave the invention to the 
public); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 
305, 307–09 (1992) (noting the risk of dissipating the social returns of innovation through 
wasteful patent racing). 
 65. Cf. Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 720–25 (describing how patent law disin-
centivizes investing in research to discover new uses for products); Sherkow, Reproducibility 
Paradox, supra note 29, at 847–50 (“[T]he availability of patents . . . appears to hamper or 
even actively dissuade reproducibility.”). 
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in the patented innovation. If they discover a more efficient way to manu-
facture a patented drug, or a new use for that drug, they can reap the rewards 
from that deepening innovation, at least during the term of the patent.66 
For instance, sildenafil (Viagra) was originally patented and tested to treat 
hypertension.67 When the drug caused erections in male clinical trial par-
ticipants, Pfizer switched to testing it to treat erectile dysfunction,68 won 
approval,69 and sold billions of dollars of pills for that purpose—all within 
the patent term. Sildenafil was subsequently also approved for its original 
purpose.70 Both commercialization theory and prospect theory recognize 
that creating this protected space can aid commercialization efforts by the 
initial inventor.71 Thus, patentees of pioneer inventions may in fact have 
incentives, derived partly from the novelty requirement, to engage in deep-
ening innovation. 
b. New Use Patents. — Patents on new uses of existing products also 
create some incentives for forms of deepening innovation but are limited 
in their effectiveness. Patents are available when innovators discover a new 
use for an existing product.72 For instance, if a doctor discovers that an old 
drug used to treat high blood pressure also treats male pattern baldness, 
they can obtain a patent on the use of the drug to treat male pattern 
baldness—this is how we got Rogaine.73 Thus, patents can in some circum-
stances provide incentives for some types of deepening innovation. 
However, while patent doctrine tries to support this type of deepening 
innovation in theory, in practice it doesn’t do so particularly well, for two 
reasons. First, patents for new uses are typically not especially valuable, and 
therefore provide relatively weak incentives, because they are difficult to 
enforce.74 For new uses of existing drugs, once the patent covering the 
drug itself has expired, generic manufacturers can make inexpensive generic 
 
 66. This limitation is significant. As Rebecca Eisenberg has pointed out, initial innova-
tors’ incentives to develop new information drop as the patent approaches the end of its 
life, especially for slow innovations like validating new uses for drugs. See Eisenberg, New 
Uses, supra note 2, at 720. 
 67. See U.S. Patent No. 5,250,534 col. 1 l. 18 (filed May 14, 1992).  
 68. Mitradev Boolell, Michael J. Allen, Stephen A. Ballard, Sam Gepi-Attee, Gary J. 
Muirhead, Alasdair M. Naylor, Ian H. Osterloh & Clive Gingell, Sildenafil: An Orally Active 
Type 5 Cyclic GMP-Specific Phosphodiesterase Inhibitor for the Treatment of Penile Erectile 
Dysfunction, 8 Int’l J. Impotence Res. 47 (1996). 
 69. Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, to 
Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Cent. Research (Mar. 27, 1998), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTP4-FV28]. 
 70. Letter from Norman Stockbridge, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, 
FDA, to Martha C. Brumfield, Pfizer, Inc. (June 3, 2005), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2005/021845ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4XY-PJJQ]. 
 71. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25. 
 73. Compare U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 col. 1 l. 18 (filed Nov. 1, 1965) (claiming the com-
pound minoxidil and its use to treat high blood pressure), with U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 
col. 1 l. 30 (filed Aug. 19, 1977) (claiming the use of minoxidil to stimulate hair growth). 
 74. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25. 
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versions of the drug. Patients can then use the cheaper, generic version for 
any use, including the newly patented use (for example, by taking cheap 
generic minoxidil, labeled only for use for hypertension, for baldness).75 
Theoretically, the holder of the new use patent can sue doctors or patients 
for violating its patent but realistically this is an unlikely strategy.76 Thus, 
new use patents provide lower incentives than patents on entirely new 
compounds.77 
Second, as discussed below, the exclusive rights created by patents on 
earlier inventions create costs for later innovators.78 Practicing a new use 
of a patented product, even if the subject of an independent patent, can 
still be blocked by an earlier patent on the product itself. This phenome-
non reduces the net incentives to develop that new use through deepening 
innovation.79 
Taken as a whole, the doctrine of novelty creates substantial incentives 
for innovation to follow either differentiating or exploring pathways, rather 
than deepening pathways. 
2. Nonobviousness. — Nonobviousness also pushes inventors away 
from existing technologies. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention cannot 
be patented if it would have been obvious to the person having ordinary 
skill in the art,80 taking into account the universe of relevant prior art, the 
difference between the prior art and the new invention, and the skill of 
the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” or PHOSITA.81 The purpose 
of the obviousness requirement is to ensure that patents are not available 
for trivial advances in technology by requiring more substantial differ-
ences; it is a stronger screen than novelty but harder to administer.82 Under 
an incentive theory of patenting, small differences from the prior art—
often, merely differentiating innovation—are too easy to need the incen-
tive of an additional patent.83 The nonobviousness requirement thus aims 
 
 75. Id. at 720. There are complex strategies to try to avoid this pattern, but they do not 
always work, and an exploration of them is outside the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., Robin 
Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 
53 Harv. J. on Legis. 499, 549–54 (2016) (discussing the strategy of “skinny label[ing],” 
wherein brand companies attempt to restrict generic behavior by limiting the approved uses 
listed on the drug’s label). 
 76. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm. 
& Tech. L. Rev. 345, 351 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Role of the FDA]; see also Amy 
Kapczynski & Talha Syed, supra note 44, at 1917 (explaining how social norms make it prob-
lematic for patentees to sue doctors). 
 77. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25. 
 78. See infra section II.B. 
 79. See Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 32–33. 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 81. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3, 17 (1966). 
 82. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–18 (2007) (describing the 
potential challenges a court may face in evaluating the obviousness of a new invention). 
 83. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High Tech. 
L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (arguing that uncertain innovation should more likely be held nonobvious). 
786 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:769 
 
specifically at driving divergent innovation, and exploring innovation in 
particular. It doesn’t always work. 
Nonobviousness provides a weaker filter for exploring innovation in 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries than elsewhere.84 Pre-
dictability is the touchstone of obviousness, and these fields are considered 
to be inherently unpredictable.85 If a medicinal chemist would be expected 
to know that an existing drug could be improved by changing its structure 
in a particular way, the nonobviousness doctrine should theoretically bar 
receiving a patent on that improved drug.86 But as Rebecca Eisenberg 
notes, nonobviousness analysis in pharmaceuticals suffers from something 
of an opposite hindsight bias—rather than innovations looking more obvious 
in hindsight, they look less obvious.87 The Federal Circuit (the appellate 
court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent law) has accordingly made ob-
viousness very hard to show. 
To determine whether new chemicals—including pharmaceuticals—
are obvious, the Federal Circuit has adopted a doctrine known as “lead 
compound analysis.”88 Essentially, if you want to show that a new chemical 
is obvious, you do two things: First, you find a close relative that is already 
known and second, you argue that the inventive step from that prior art 
compound to the new compound would be an obvious step for a PHOSITA 
to take.89 This is hard. Under the lead compound analysis framework, the 
prior art must essentially contain each step rather plainly to demonstrate 
prima facie obviousness.90 To show that a chemist of ordinary skill would 
select that chemical as a “lead compound”—“a compound in the prior art 
that would be most promising to modify”91—structural similarity is neces-
sary but insufficient; the field must know something about the putative 
lead compound, such as activity, solubility, or toxicity, that makes it a 
 
 84. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 
1593 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (“In biotechnology cases, the 
Federal Circuit has gone to inordinate lengths to find biotechnological inventions 
nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention.”). 
 85. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18 (emphasizing predictability); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened 
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 127, 137–39 (2008) (“[E]ven though 
the judiciary recognizes the unique challenges that inventions in the unpredictable arts 
bring to the patent system, it has struggled to adapt the old doctrinal framework of the 
patent laws to meet these challenges.”). 
 86. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 532–34. 
 87. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 375, 
378 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem]. 
 88. See generally Briana Barron, Structural Uncertainty: Understanding the Federal 
Circuit’s Lead Compound Analysis, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 401 (2012). The Federal 
Circuit reaffirmed this relatively rigid test even after the Supreme Court counseled flexibility 
in the obviousness analysis in KSR. Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 89. Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 90. Id. at 1291. 
 91. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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promising lead.92 Once a lead compound (or a small set of lead com-
pounds) is identified, you must show that “prior art would have supplied 
one of ordinary skill in the art with a reason or motivation to modify a lead 
compound to make the claimed compound with a reasonable expectation 
of success.”93 This is a lot to ask of the prior art.94 
Once a prima facie obviousness showing has been made, the patentee 
can rebut it by showing unexpected properties compared to prior art com-
pounds95—a factor that Chris Cotropia has noted adds an ex post windfall 
element to nonobviousness rather than actually driving innovators to 
pursue nonobvious paths.96 Overall, “lead compound analysis greatly 
favors the patentee in most situations,”97 and “[i]n some biotechnology 
cases, [the Federal Circuit’s approach] has functioned as a virtual per se 
rule of nonobviousness for molecules that are not structurally similar to 
molecules disclosed in the prior art.”98 
In sum, although nonobviousness doctrine pushes innovators to 
pursue exploring innovation rather than differentiating innovation, the 
doctrine has little bite in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. It still 
pushes for divergent innovation over deepening innovation—the new 
technology must still be different from what has come before—but pushes 
less strongly for exploring innovation. This weaker requirement allows 
relatively small variations on known biopharmaceutical products to pass 
the nonobviousness requirement.99 
3. Utility. — Finally, an invention must be useful to be patentable.100 
The utility doctrine does not directly promote divergent innovation, but it 
does permit innovation to be new-for-the-sake-of-new, rather than better, 
and that was not always a foregone conclusion. The first Patent Act, passed 
in 1790, required that three cabinet members “deem the invention or 
 
 92. Otsuka, 678 F.3d at 1292. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 377 (noting that 
the Federal Circuit has “articulated an approach to evaluating the (non)obviousness of 
chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals, that sometimes seems as ‘rigid and 
mandatory’ as the [teaching, suggestion, or motivation] approach at issue in KSR”). 
 95. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, 550 F.3d 1075, 1089–90 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 96. Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law After 
KSR, 20 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 391, 394–95 (2014). 
 97. Barron, supra note 88, at 423; see also Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness 
Test for New Pharmaceutical Compounds: Gobbledygook?, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 49, 
54 (2014) (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . applies . . . a test for new pharmaceutical compounds 
that generally makes it more difficult than under KSR to prove obviousness.”). 
 98. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 377. 
 99. See id.; Amir A. Naini, Convergent Technologies and Divergent Patent Validity 
Doctrines: Obviousness and Disclosure Analyses in Software and Biotechnology, 86 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 541, 544–60 (2004) (describing the effects of “a relatively low nonobvi-
ousness barrier”); see also infra section III.B.1 (discussing me-too drugs). 
 100. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2012); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 
1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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discovery sufficiently useful and important,” requiring some meaningful 
advance.101 But this language was eliminated in 1793.102 In the 1817 case 
Lowell v. Lewis, the renowned patent litigator Daniel Webster argued that 
inventions should only be patentable if they were not only new but also 
better than existing technology.103 Justice Story, riding circuit, roundly 
rejected this argument: 
All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivo-
lous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals 
of society. But if the invention steers wide of these objections, 
whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material 
to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the pub-
lic. If it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt 
and disregard.104 
Congress reintroduced an “importance” requirement in the 1836 Act.105 
Michael Risch argues that the 1836 Act aimed to require some commercial 
utility,106 but courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) largely failed to implement that requirement and the utility require-
ment has become “toothless” over time.107 The Supreme Court did hold 
in Brenner v. Manson that patentability requires “benefit derived by the 
public from an invention with substantial utility,”108 which could theoret-
ically justify some commercial relevance requirement.109 However, the 
Federal Circuit weakened that holding in In re Brana, which held that 
utility can be found even in very oblique assertions by the patent applicant, 
that the patent examiner bears the burden of rebutting asserted utility, and 
even that treating tumors in lab mice provides enough utility to satisfy the 
requirement.110 
The utility requirement does not require superiority to existing tech-
nology. Demonstrating superiority (or market demand, which is a weak 
proxy) is hard at the time of patenting, which is typically early in the 
 
 101. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 102. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793) (repealed 1836). 
 103. 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1870). 
 106. Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1195, 1236–40. 
 107. Id. at 1195. But see Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1046, 
1060–66 (2014) [hereinafter Seymore, Making Patents Useful] (arguing that the utility 
requirement is minimal for certain types of inventions but stringent for others). 
 108. 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 109. See Risch, supra note 106, at 1232. Interestingly enough, nonobviousness doctrine 
does sometimes take commercial relevance into account because commercial success is a 
secondary indicator of nonobviousness—though as Robert Merges has noted, the link be-
tween commercial success and nonobviousness requires quite a few steps. Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. 
L. Rev. 803, 838–52 (1988) [hereinafter Merges, Commercial Success] (presenting and cri-
tiquing this inferential leap). 
 110. 51 F.3d 1560, 1565–69 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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development process; firms may not know themselves how well their 
innovations perform.111 But that difficulty is not insurmountable. Jake 
Sherkow, for instance, argues that post-application evidence should be 
admissible to prove lack of enablement (and consequently, lack of utility) 
for drugs that looked like they would work but actually did not.112 
The Indian patent system goes even further. Section 3(d) of the 
Indian Patents Act prohibits patenting derivatives of an existing sub-
stance—including new forms of drugs—unless they result “in the enhance-
ment of the known efficacy of that substance.”113 Section 3(d) deals with 
the timing difficulty through its limited applicability—it is not relevant to 
all innovations, just those that involve new forms of a known compound.114 
These inventions are especially likely to be differentiating innovation 
without new benefits.115 A patent on such an innovation requires a demon-
stration that the differentiation actually constitutes an improvement. The 
Indian Supreme Court used this provision to deny a patent on Gleevec, a 
blockbuster cancer drug sold by Novartis for which the patent covered only 
a new form of a known chemical with no improved efficacy.116 Amy 
Kapczynski has argued that this provision should help innovation by driv-
ing companies to develop drugs that are better, not just new.117 
Demonstrating superiority can be challenging even setting aside the 
timing challenges. When a later innovation changes an earlier product so 
that it works better for some but worse for others, is that an improvement? 
If it works a bit worse, but at a much lower price?118 The now-defunct 
Canadian promise doctrine held patentees to their own promises of utility, 
sidestepping the problem by letting patentees define the goal.119 Indian 
law leaves it largely undefined, at least for now. For biomedical innovation, 
the issue may be somewhat easier due to the presence of regulators qualified 
 
 111. See Risch, supra note 106, at 1211–16 (noting the challenges of demonstrating 
commercial utility at the time of patenting). 
 112. Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 29, at 907–11. 
 113. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code, ch. 2 § 3(d), https://indiacode.nic.in/ 
bitstream/123456789/1392/3/a1970-39.pdf#search=PAtent%20acts [https://perma.cc/M4NV- 
3D2U]. The section, overall focused on novelty, also prohibits patenting “the mere discovery 
of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, 
machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at 
least one new reactant.” Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See infra section III.A. 
 116. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 13 SCR 148, 274–76 (India). 
 117. Amy Kapcysnski, Engineered in India—Patent Law 2.0, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 497, 
498 (2013). 
 118. See generally Aaron L. Nelson, Joshua T. Cohen, Dan Greenberg & David M. Kent, 
Much Cheaper, Almost as Good: Decrementally Cost-Effective Medical Innovation, 151 
Annals Internal Med. 662 (2009) [hereinafter Nelson et al., Almost as Good]. 
 119. See Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of False Promise, 29 Canadian Intell. 
Prop. Rev. 3, 4–5 (2013) (describing the doctrine); id. at 47–55 (criticizing the doctrine); 
see also AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 36 (Can.) (elim-
inating the doctrine). 
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to evaluate at least some claims of superiority, particularly for close variants 
of the same product.120 But in any event, U.S. utility doctrines do not re-
quire improvement. 
B. Infringement 
Incentives from infringement mirror those from patentability. A 
person infringes a patent when they make, use, sell, or import the patented 
invention.121 The patentee may seek injunctive relief or damages for patent 
infringement.122 Therefore, a later innovator working in a particular area 
has an incentive to avoid infringing an earlier patent on an invention in 
that area (assuming they are aware of the patent123). If Jenn is working in 
the field of epinephrine auto-injectors, she has an incentive to avoid the 
subject matter covered in patents on the EpiPen; if she cannot, she’ll have 
to share some of her profits with the holders of those patents.124 
A rich literature discusses patent policy in the context of cumulative 
innovation.125 If the later innovation is worthwhile (that is, if Jenn’s ideas 
for innovation based on the EpiPen are valuable), the innovation should 
theoretically still take place because the patentee should be willing to 
license the patent to the later innovator.126 But licensing is hard. Suzanne 
Scotchmer and colleagues have theorized about how best to divide R&D 
efforts and social surplus between earlier and later inventors, concluding 
that ex ante licenses are generally the best way to allocate surplus.127 Ex 
post licenses are harder to reach and can result in hold-up problems.128 
However, empirical evidence gathered by Heidi Williams and others sug-
gests that ex ante licenses occur relatively rarely;129 James Bessen argues 
 
 120. See infra section IV.A. 
 121. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 122. Id. §§ 283–284. 
 123. See Ouellette, Useful Information, supra note 36, at 557–59, 566–71 (discussing 
why scientists might not read patents but finding evidence that at least some do). 
 124. See, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (“[A] blocking patent diminishes possible rewards from a non-owner’s or non-
licensee’s investment activity aimed at an invention whose commercial exploitation would 
be infringing, therefore reducing incentives for innovations in the blocked space by non-
owners and non-licensees of the blocking patent.”). 
 125. See generally, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit 
in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. Econ. 265 (1995) (discussing patents and cumulative 
innovation); Scotchmer, supra note 22 (same). 
 126. See, e.g., James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and 
Imitation, 40 RAND J. Econ. 611, 613 (2009) (“[I]f the follow-on R&D is worthwhile, [the 
patent holder] could share in its value by a suitably chosen licensing fee/royalty, thereby 
increasing her own profit . . . .”). Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory of patents is a strong artic-
ulation of this idea. Kitch, supra note 38, at 276–80. 
 127. Green & Scotchmer, supra note 125, at 21. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the 
Human Genome, 121 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 23 (2013) [hereinafter Williams, Intellectual Property 
Rights]; see also Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 
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that information asymmetries between the two parties can limit licens-
ing.130 Williams identifies other limits, including Arrow’s information para-
dox (you can’t dicker over the price of an idea unless the idea is shared, 
but once it’s been shared, why would the prospective buyer pay for it?).131 
Whatever the exact causes, some empirical evidence suggests that IP on 
earlier biomedical innovations limits later innovation in that area.132 
Given a range of more and less divergent innovation possibilities, a 
later innovator faces patent incentives to choose more divergent options 
to avoid compensating the initial licensee through either licensing or 
patent infringement.133 Negotiating a successful license is challenging, 
whether ex ante or ex post, and in either case the later innovator must 
share profits with the earlier patentee.134 Infringement liability is proba-
bilistic but can be catastrophic.135 The innovator could also simply ignore 
the patent, but that is a risky strategy, especially in biopharmaceutical 
contexts where FDA approval and patents are tightly linked.136 In any case, 
it may be easier—all else being equal—to avoid the problem altogether by 
avoiding infringement of the patent. 
Direct infringement liability can be found in either of two ways, each 
of which has features promoting divergent innovation. First, literal infringe-
ment requires that the accused product be exactly covered by a patent; this 
encourages inventing around, a form of divergent innovation in which 
later innovators make changes to avoid infringement liability or the need 
 
48 J. Indus. Econ. 103, 115 (2000) (finding low rates of ex ante licensing in many technological 
areas, with the highest ex ante licensing rates (twenty-three percent) in chemicals and phar-
maceuticals). 
 130. James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private 
Information, 82 Econ. Letters 321, 323 (2004). 
 131. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 129, at 23. 
 132. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698–99 (1998) (making a theo-
retical argument about blocking gene patents); Fiona Murray, Philippe Aghion, Mathias 
Dewatripoint, Julian Kolev & Scott Stern, Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of 
Openness on Innovation, 8 Am. Econ. J. 212, 235–36 (2016) (finding that removing IP on 
genetically engineered mice led to about a twenty to forty percent increase in citations to 
scientific papers on those mice); see also Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 
129, at 4 (“Celera’s IP appears to have generated economically and statistically significant 
reductions in subsequent scientific research and product development, on the order of 20–
30 percent.”). But see Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-
On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 203, 229 (2019) 
(finding that gene patenting did not decrease later innovation among genes of similar po-
tential value). 
 133. Payment through patent infringement is probabilistic; it depends on a successful 
suit (or willingness to pay in response to a demand letter). Nevertheless, the expected lia-
bility for infringing a patent is greater than zero. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Probabilistic Patents, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2005, at 75, 88–89. 
 134. See Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 129, at 22–24. 
 135. See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 133, at 79–80 (discussing the econom-
ics of probabilistic patents). 
 136. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19, 21–22, 29–31. 
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to license the patent.137 Literal infringement promotes differentiating 
infringement. Second, the doctrine of equivalents creates liability beyond 
the clear limits of a patent’s claim.138 It promotes exploratory innovation. 
1. Literal Infringement and Inventing Around. — Literal infringement 
requires that the accused product contain every element in the claimed 
invention.139 To avoid infringement liability, innovators (those aware of an 
existing patent) may engage in the process of “inventing around”: altering 
an invention enough that it falls outside the boundaries of the patent 
claims.140 For instance, if a claim described two pieces of a hinge with 
recesses directly across from one another, a later entrant might make a 
very similar product with the recesses offset from one another, thus 
attempting to avoid literal infringement.141 Inventing around has at times 
been heralded as a spur to creativity on the part of later innovators;142 in 
this case, perhaps offset recesses prolong hinge life or are easier to manu-
facture. But perhaps not. 
At base, inventing around requires that later innovators change an 
invention, not because they may improve it, or because they may increase 
the invention’s social welfare value or market share, but rather because 
that change is necessary to avoid patent infringement. The second inven-
tion differs purely for the sake of difference. Sometimes inventing around 
may require trivial effort, such as substituting a different type of fastening; 
other times, it may require substantial effort, such as developing a slight 
 
 137. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, 
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1349, 1360–61 
(2011) (describing the practice of inventing around in the context of genetic patents). 
 138. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) 
(describing the doctrine of equivalents as protecting against infringements of a product that 
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same 
result”). 
 139. Literal infringement is the mirror to anticipation, discussed supra section II.A.1. A 
well-known maxim states, “That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” Peters 
v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 21 F. 319, 321 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884)). 
 140. See Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 137, at 1360–61. To be sure, innovators may wish 
to go further than just outside the boundaries of the patent claim, since the doctrine of 
equivalents occasionally allows patentees to reach beyond those literal boundaries. See infra 
section II.B.2. 
 141. Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1126–27 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirm-
ing a finding of no literal infringement and reversing a finding of infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents). 
 142. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Free to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128 
Harv. L. Rev. Forum 125, 125–26 (2015) (noting the creativity-enhancing effects of inventing 
around); see also, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235–36 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (finding that the defendant’s conduct “involving keeping track of a competitor’s 
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the 
stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer”). 
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chemical variation on a drug and then taking that variant through hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of clinical trials.143 
Birth control pills provide an excellent example of pointless inventing 
around. Bio-Technology Group makes Mircette, an oral contraceptive 
protected by a patent that claims administering one week of an estrogenic 
compound (during the user’s period) followed by three weeks of proges-
tin.144 Duramed filed an application to market a generic version of the 
drug—but to avoid infringing the patent, it changed the order of the drug 
to three weeks of progestin followed by one week of an estrogenic 
compound.145 Duramed hoped this unnecessary and unhelpful inventing 
around would help it avoid infringing the relevant patent. (It didn’t work.146) 
2. The Doctrine of Equivalents. — The doctrine of equivalents allows 
courts to find infringement beyond the bounds of literal infringement. 
Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product can infringe a patent, even 
if it does not literally infringe, so long as it is not substantially different 
from the patented invention.147 The doctrine of equivalents pushes inno-
vation from differentiating innovation toward exploring innovation; to the 
extent that the doctrine brings slightly different inventions to the fuzzy 
ambit of a patent claim, later inventors face incentives to diverge further 
from the existing product. Patents on especially groundbreaking inven-
tions can theoretically be treated as “pioneer patents,” which receive even 
broader protection, creating additional incentives for exploring innova-
tion.148 Nevertheless, the doctrine of equivalents has become substantially 
weaker over the years, including decreasing emphasis on pioneer pa-
tents,149 which has the impact of decreasing the incentives for exploring 
innovation relative to merely differentiating innovation.150 
 
 143. See infra section III.B. 
 144. U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,724 col. 7 ll. 36–50. 
 145. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232–33 (D.N.J. 
2001), rev’d, 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 146. See id. at 234–41 (finding no infringement). But see Bio-Tech. Gen., 325 F.3d at 
1361, 1364 (reversing the district court). 
 147. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 726–
27 (2002); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
 148. See generally Esther Steinhauer, Note, Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide 
Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection for Improvement Patents, 12 Pace 
L. Rev. 491 (1992) (attempting to “reconcile[] the application of the doctrine of equivalents 
with the protection of innovative and useful research”). 
 149. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine 
of Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 958–60 & n.18 (2007) (“The [pioneer patent] doctrine 
today may or may not be moribund, though it is clearly applied only infrequently by the 
Federal Circuit.”). 
 150. Notably, the doctrine of reverse equivalents also promotes divergent innovation. 
This doctrine—mostly moribund—holds that an accused product that literally infringes may 
not infringe if it is in fact very different from the subject matter of the original patent. Robert 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75, 75 (1994) (describing the reverse equivalents doctrine as “basi-
cally a rule of excused infringement; when it applies, it declares that even though a patentee 
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* * * * 
Taken together, multiple doctrines of patentability and infringement 
promote divergent innovation but do not require improvement. Novelty 
and nonobviousness directly make it easier to obtain patents for differen-
tiating or exploring innovation, and infringement liability, whether literal 
or by equivalents, creates incentives to stray from existing, patented 
technology. Coupled with these, the utility requirement allows differen-
tiating innovation and exploring innovation without any accompanying 
social welfare gain from improving the innovation. Thus, the costs of 
divergence, described below, are less likely to be offset by the benefits of 
improved technology. 
III. THE DARK SIDE OF DIVERGENT INNOVATION 
Patent law drives divergent innovation, and divergence can create real 
problems along with its benefits. This Part considers in detail three forms 
of costs arising from divergent innovation: the costs of inventing around, 
the lack of interoperability or standards, and the dispersion of knowledge 
about particular technologies. It illustrates these problems through three 
in-depth case studies and shorter examples. But novelty is not all bad; this 
Part thus begins with a brief account of its benefits. 
A. Benefits of Divergent Innovation 
To be sure, pushing innovators to constantly explore new paths of 
innovation has benefits—I am not suggesting that innovation is bad, or 
that creating incentives such that innovators broadly explore many possi-
ble paths is inherently problematic. The benefits of innovation are widely 
recognized,151 and to the extent that our default conception of innovation 
is to focus on new products or technologies, these benefits are largely 
associated with divergent innovation. Most importantly, while patent doc-
trine does not require that inventions be better, only new,152 the inventions 
certainly can be better, and these improvements drive progress. 
Scholars have long argued that inventing around can be beneficial. 
As Joseph Fishman summarizes, “The basic insight is that the patentee’s 
 
has proven infringement, the infringer is free from liability”). But see Tate Access Floors, 
Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the reverse doctrine of equivalents had never been applied by the Federal Circuit). To the 
extent that this takes truly divergent innovations out of the scope of literal infringement, 
the doctrine of reverse equivalents promotes divergent innovation by exempting inventions 
from the licensing fees or infringement liability resulting from earlier patents. But, as noted, 
this doctrine is largely gone from practice. 
 151. See, e.g., Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 507–15 (“Pharmaceutical 
innovation is often seen as the golden child of the patent system, with patents taking credit 
for the discovery and development of valuable new drugs that provide tremendous health 
benefits to the public.”). 
 152. See supra section II.A.3. 
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right to exclude triggers a virtuous cycle in which one invention begets a 
competing and sometimes even better invention.”153 We often don’t know 
the best solution to a problem beforehand, and inventing around results 
in diverse potential solutions.154 Scholars of innovation law and judges on 
the Federal Circuit alike have argued that inventing around can generate 
useful solutions and aid innovation.155 
If consumers can identify better innovations, the market should re-
ward improvements. Nonmonetary considerations can also drive improve-
ment over mere differentiation—many innovators are driven not just by 
profit motives but by the desire to improve the world.156 Finally, even if the 
innovator is not trying to improve existing technology, but just to change 
it, some fraction of changes will be improvements purely by chance. Such 
improvements are a desirable result of divergent innovation and fit well 
with the goals of the patent system. 
Some benefits arise from divergent innovation even when the 
innovation is not better—when it is just different, or perhaps even when it 
is somewhat worse. Mere difference can itself be beneficial. In a world of 
varying needs, different solutions can be helpful, even if none is strictly 
better: Users may have different tradeoffs between risks and benefits, 
drugs may have different side effects, or users may have different prefer-
ences along any number of dimensions.157 We may also learn new facts 
from the mere existence of variation.158 
Divergent innovation that yields no technical improvement can also 
lower costs. Most straightforwardly, competition between substitutes should 
lower costs to consumers.159 The only producer in a class can charge 
 
 153. Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1339 (2015). 
 154. Id. at 1353. 
 155. See, e.g., id. at 1353–55; see also, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 
F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 
‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are pa-
tented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”). 
 156. See generally, e.g., Maurice Cassier & Christiane Sinding, ‘Patenting in the Public 
Interest:’ Administration of Insulin Patents by the University of Toronto, 24 Hist. & Tech. 
153 (2008) (describing the patenting of insulin and licensing to the University of Toronto 
for management in the public interest); Margit Osterloh & Sandra Rota, Open Source 
Software Development—Just Another Case of Collective Invention?, 36 Res. Pol’y 157 
(2007) (describing the open software movement and intrinsic motivation for invention). 
 157. This variation may, of course, be captured in broader definitions of “better” prod-
ucts. See supra section II.A.3. 
 158. But see infra section III.D (describing the costs associated with broader, shallower 
knowledge from divergent innovation). 
 159. See Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical 
Markets 1 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
455P-T932] (discussing the benefits of competition between substitutes). In the drug indus-
try in particular, competition between substitutes is complicated because it is mediated by 
FDA; substitutes may be similar drugs that are also branded or generic drugs that are 
determined to be bioequivalent by FDA. See id. at 8–10. 
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monopoly prices, but once multiple substitutes exist in a product class—
different, even if not better—prices should drop closer to the cost of 
production. Competition between substitutes doesn’t always work espe-
cially well in biomedical innovation, where patient and doctor preferences 
for particular products can be sticky and can reduce competition, but it 
still has some effect even there and is tremendously important in markets 
in general.160 Costs can also be lowered through a different type of diver-
gent innovation, in which the new technology actually performs worse but 
does so at a lower cost, which may be a preferable combination to some 
purchasers.161 
The benefits from divergent innovation are substantial, whether the 
innovation is an improvement or not. Nevertheless, balanced against those 
benefits are costs that are less often recognized. 
B. Costs of Inventing Around 
Inventing around an existing patented invention is costly. When down-
stream inventors are forced to vary an invention simply for the purpose of 
avoiding an existing patent, they spend R&D resources on something that 
may turn out to have little or no benefit.162 Even if the result is beneficial, 
other innovation might have been a better allocation of those resources.163 
In a prominent early study of the R&D costs of imitating competitors, 
Richard Levin and colleagues found substantial costs of inventing around.164 
Many industry leaders stated that duplicating competitors’ patented major 
new processes or products would cost nearly as much as the competitor 
spent to develop it in the first place.165 Without patents, the estimated costs 
dropped significantly, suggesting that inventing around patents is a costly 
 
 160. See generally, e.g., Panos Kanavos, Joan Costa Font & Alistair McGuire, Product 
Differentiation, Competition, and Regulation of New Drugs: The Case of Statins in Four 
European Countries, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 455 (2007) (discussing competition 
among statins in Europe). 
 161. See Nelson et al., Almost as Good, supra note 118, at 662. 
 162. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115, 190–
91 (2003); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
1813, 1869–70 (1984). 
 163. See, e.g., Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review of the Patent System 50–52 (Comm. Print 1958) 
(authored by Fritz Machlup) (lamenting how inventing around wastes “inventive talent”). 
 164. Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 Brookings Papers 
on Econ. Activity 783, 802–11 (1987), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
1987/12/1987c_bpea_levin_klevorick_nelson_winter_gilbert_griliches.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PKU7-BWNR]. 
 165. Id. at 809 (reporting that, in 66 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the costs 
of duplicating a major patented new process to be 76 to 100% of the innovator’s R&D costs; 
in 63 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the same for products). 
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endeavor;166 similarly, duplication costs for patented inventions increased 
more in industries with stronger patent protection in general.167 Overall, 
Levin and colleagues found that patents raise imitation costs by forty per-
cent for new drugs, thirty percent for major new chemical products, and 
twenty-five percent for typical new chemical products168—presumably all 
differentiating inventions to copy the product with enough differences to 
avoid the patents. For electronics, patents increased imitation costs by 
seven to fifteen percent for major products and seven to ten percent for 
typical products.169 These numbers are old—the survey was conducted in 
1987—but the general pattern accords with the idea that patents substan-
tially increase the costs of developing existing technologies by requiring 
inventing around. 
The drug industry provides many examples of divergent innovation 
with high costs of inventing around. Two areas stand out: “me-too” drugs 
and evergreening practices. 
1. Me-Too Drugs. — Me-too drugs, also known as “follow-on” drugs, 
have similar chemical structures and mechanisms of action as already-
marketed drugs.170 They evoke both sides of divergent innovation: Critics 
argue that they require redundant R&D with little benefit,171 while support-
ers argue they can better serve different subpopulations and can reduce 
prices through competition.172 
Statins show how patents drive me-too drug development and how devel-
opment’s costs can outweigh its benefits.173 Researchers began synthesizing 
 
 166. Id. (reporting that, in 49 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the costs of du-
plicating a major unpatented new process to be 76 to 100% of innovator R&D; in 40 of 127 
industries, respondents estimated the same for products). 
 167. Id. at 810. Although the costs of duplication increased with a patent, the time to 
duplication decreased in some industries, suggesting that the disclosure found in patents at 
least helps focus duplicative R&D efforts. Id. at 810–11. 
 168. Id. at 811. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Joseph A. DiMasi & Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in Follow-On Drug R&D: A 
Race or Imitation?, 10 Nature Revs. Drug Discovery 23, 23 (2011). 
 171. Id.; see also Nicole M. Gastala, Peter Wingrove, Anne Gaglioti, Stephen Petterson 
& Andrew Bazemore, Medicare Part D: Patients Bear the Cost of ‘Me Too’ Brand-Name 
Drugs, 35 Health Aff. 1237, 1237 (2016). 
 172. See DiMasi & Faden, supra note 170, at 23. The price-competition point is espe-
cially complex for drugs; while competition between different on-patent branded drugs can 
reduce prices, the entry of generic versions of a branded drug results in far lower prices. See 
Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-
evaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/66B9- 
BLHU] (last updated Dec. 19, 2019). To the extent that me-too drugs result in higher use 
of branded drugs relative to generic drugs, the overall market price for the group of drugs 
is thus likely to remain higher. 
 173. See Gastala et al., supra note 171, at 1237 exhibit 1 (using statins to illustrate how 
“me-too” drugs raise costs for consumers); see also Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, 
How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too Many?, 305 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 711, 711 (2011) (illustrating 
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statins in the late 1970s to lower cholesterol and reduce the risk of coro-
nary heart disease.174 Merck received FDA approval for the first, Mevacor 
(lovastatin), in 1987.175 Since Mevacor’s release, researchers have discov-
ered eight more statins; FDA has approved six of them.176 Pfizer’s Lipitor 
(atorvastatin) was approved in 1997 and became one of the best-selling 
drugs of all time, with over $100 billion in revenue by 2011.177 AstraZeneca’s 
Crestor (rosuvastatin), approved in 2003, had over $62 billion in sales by 
2017.178 
The development of Crestor shows the power of patent law’s incen-
tives for divergent innovation. After Pfizer brought Lipitor to market in 
1987, researchers in Japan sought to develop a new statin.179 The research-
ers initially experimented with variations on the same chemical core 
contained in atorvastatin.180 Results from those early experiments, how-
ever, proved toxic in animals, stymieing the researchers’ progress.181 So 
they switched gears, moving to a different chemical core.182 Working with 
this new core, the researchers discovered rosuvastatin, a new statin that 
appeared to have promising levels of potency with limited side effects in 
animal studies.183 In 1993, the researchers received a patent for their dis-
covery,184 which was eventually sold as the blockbuster drug Crestor.185 
In the process, patent law pushed the research in a direction that 
researchers expected would be only moderately successful—but which, 
 
how “me-too” drugs like statins “may make treatment decisions more difficult and may 
undermine clinical outcomes”). 
 174. See Akira Endo, A Historical Perspective on the Discovery of Statins, 86 Proc. Japan 
Acad. Series B Physical & Biological Sci. 484, 487, 489 (2010). 
 175. See id. at 490; Jeremy A. Greene, The Abnormal and the Pathological: Cholesterol, 
Statins, and the Threshold of Disease, in Medicating Modern America: Prescription Drugs 
in History 183, 183–84 (Andrea Tone & Elizabeth Siegel Watkins eds., 2007). 
 176. See Emma Hennessy, Claire Adams, F. Jerry Reen & Fergal O’Gara, Is There Potential 
for Repurposing Statins as Novel Antimicrobials?, 60 Antimicrobial Agents & Chemotherapy 
5111, 5111 (2016). 
 177. See Veronique Dupont, Pfizer’s Blockbuster Drug Lipitor Goes Generic, Med. Xpress 
(Nov. 30, 2011), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-11-pfizer-blockbuster-drug-lipitor.html 
 [https://perma.cc/39V2-CHXU]. 
 178. Tracy Staton, 1. Crestor, FiercePharma (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.fiercepharma.com/ 
special-report/1-crestor [https://perma.cc/4J4N-Y7VW]; see also In re Rosuvastatin Calcium 
Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 515 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 179. See In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 515. 
 180. See Plaintiffs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 5–6, In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent 
Litig., 719 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Del. 2010), 1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313. 
 181. See id. at 6–7. 
 182. Id. at 7. 
 183. Id. at 7–8. 
 184. U.S. Patent No. 5,260,440. 
 185. In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 514–15 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
Arguably, the development process includes elements of all three types of innovation; 
researchers started out trying to differentiate and ended up moving more toward exploring 
innovation once they found toxicity—perhaps best characterized as a form of deepening 
innovation. 
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coincidentally, would be easier to patent. Counsel for AstraZeneca de-
scribed the invention during a 2010 patent dispute.186 Counsel noted that 
a PHOSITA, “if provided with the structure of rosuvastatin on [the date of 
invention], at best might expect that rosuvastatin would function as a statin 
and therefore could inhibit cholesterol in humans.”187 Thus, researchers 
would think rosuvastatin was—at best!—nothing more than a me-too 
statin.188 And in fact, this “at best” result was probably not reality. At the 
time, researchers “would have . . . expected” that a structure like rosuvas-
tatin would have “poor activity, and thus be considered a failure” based on 
the prevailing research.189 As the Federal Circuit noted, “[A]t least five 
pharmaceutical companies had abandoned their research on statins with 
[similar chemical] cores, on the prevailing belief that [such] statins were 
not promising leads to improved products.”190 
While this likelihood of failure makes research less promising to 
pursue, it makes getting a patent easier. One of the secondary indicia of 
nonobviousness is “teaching away”; if the prevailing knowledge in a field 
suggests that a new solution will not be successful and “teaches away” from 
that solution, that solution becomes more likely to be nonobvious and 
therefore patentable.191 Similarly, surprising and unexpected results make 
inventions more likely to be patented and bolstered the validity of the 
patent covering Crestor.192 
To reiterate: I am not arguing that patent law’s penchant for diver-
gence is all bad, in this example or elsewhere. Pursuing modifications to 
the same chemical scaffold can have benefits, lowering the risk of off-target 
effects and leading cheaper development.193 Small tweaks to a molecule 
could also make it much better, and it is often difficult to know in advance 
whether they will. In the case of Crestor, patent law created incentives for 
 
 186. In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 388. 
 187. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 72, In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d 388, 
1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313. 
 188. In fact, AstraZeneca did not even license the drug rights (a proxy for measuring its 
commercial potential) from the original patent assignee until 1998, five years after the first 
U.S. rosuvastatin patent issued. Benjamin Yang, Drug Profile: Crestor, Discovery Med. (May 
23, 2009), http://www.discoverymedicine.com/Benjamin-Yang/2009/05/23/drug-profile-
crestor/ [https://perma.cc/V4TD-9MND]. 
 189. See Plaintiffs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 56, In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d 
388, 1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313. 
 190. In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 517. 
 191. See In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A reference may be said to 
teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discour-
aged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction 
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”). 
 192. See In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 516–18 (explaining how unexpectedness sup-
ported the plaintiff’s patent). 
 193. See Camille G. Wermuth, Similarity in Drugs: Reflections on Analogue Design, 11 
Drug Discovery Today 348, 348–49 (2006) (“The process of using marketed drug structures 
as a basis for investigation . . . results in increased efficacy and safety of therapeutic agents, 
thanks to iterative improvements.”). 
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Japanese researchers to pursue a new line of research (even though, and 
in fact because, it seemed unlikely to work). That type of counterintuitive 
knowledge creation—that the new line did actually work—is innovation 
that we wouldn’t get without patents. 
But statins and other divergent me-too drugs come with substantial 
costs, and it is not at all clear that those costs are worth the benefits. One 
meta-analysis comparing four leading statins found that “it is barely possi-
ble to differentiate between the different statins in relation to any out-
come.”194 The authors found that statins were equally effective across 
subpopulations including women, patients with diabetes, and older patients, 
and are all generally well tolerated.195 There is little difference between 
the drugs, but drug companies have developed eight statins and gotten 
them approved, and each one costs substantial resources in terms of making 
the drug, running clinical trials, and undergoing FDA evaluation.196 
Me-too drugs are also costly in terms of, well, cost. More drugs in a 
class may decrease the average cost of branded drugs by some amount—a 
common argument for me-too drugs and differentiating innovation in 
general.197 However, branded me-too drugs are typically much more 
expensive than generic versions of the earlier drugs and sometimes are 
developed even after the pioneer drug has already lost patent protection 
and generics have entered the market (multiple statins follow this pat-
tern).198 Nevertheless, many doctors and patients stick with the more 
expensive me-too drugs rather than shifting to the far cheaper generics, 
raising social costs and firm profits alike.199 Why? It’s typically not because 
 
 194. S. Ward, M. Lloyd Jones, A. Pandor, M. Holmes, R. Ara, A. Ryan, W. Yeo & N. Payne, 
A Systematic Review and Economic Evaluation of Statins for the Prevention of Coronary 
Events, Health Tech. Assessment, Apr. 2007, at 1, 63; see also Murray Aitken, Ernst R. Berndt 
& David M. Cutler, Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United States: Looking 
Beyond the Turning Point, 28 Health Aff. w151, w157 (2009) (“Although some controversy 
still exists, general consensus among the medical community is that for most patients, the 
various statins are equally effective and safe, and thus are therapeutically substitutable. An 
exception is at very high dosages, where Lipitor is believed to be more effective.”). But see 
Peter H. Jones, Michael H. Davidson, Evan A. Stein, Harold E. Bays, James M. McKenney, 
Elinor Miller, Valerie A. Cain & James W. Blasetto, Comparison of the Efficacy and Safety of 
Rosuvastatin Versus Atorvastatin, Simvastatin, and Pravastatin Across Doses (STELLAR TRIAL), 
92 Am. J. Cardiology 152, 157–59 (2003) (finding some differences among statins). 
 195. See Ward et al., supra note 194, at 48–52, 62–63; see also Cesar S. Recto II, Stella 
Acosta & Adrian Dobs, Comparison of the Efficacy and Tolerability of Simvastatin and 
Atorvastatin in the Treatment of Hypercholesterolemia, 23 Clinical Cardiology 682, 688 
(2000) (finding that simvastatin and atorvastatin are similarly tolerable). 
 196. See Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 711–12. 
 197. See Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs?, 16 Health Care Mgmt. 
Sci. 300, 301 (2013). 
 198. See Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 711. This is not always the case; many 
instances that look like me-too imitations are really drug companies racing to pursue the 
same target. See Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-On Drug 
Research and Development, PharmacoEconomics Supplement 2, Oct. 2004, at 1, 9–10. 
 199. Régnier, supra note 197, at 301 (describing how me-too drugs can lead to slower 
adoption of generics after the pioneer loses patent protection). See generally Anupam B. 
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the me-too drugs are better.200 Instead, the market share from me-too 
drugs comes largely from marketing efforts201—efforts that are unsurpris-
ingly focused on me-too drugs.202 
2. Evergreening Practices. — “Evergreening,” a special subset of me-
too drug development practices, shows especially clearly the extent of new-
for-the-sake-of-new differentiating innovation. In evergreening practices 
(also called “lifecycle management”), pharmaceutical companies engage 
in various practices to extend the effective term of patent protection on 
their drugs.203 Evergreening typically involves the initial innovator taking 
later actions to extend the effective patent life by making small changes to 
a drug.204 The initial patent on a drug inevitably expires, on average about 
twelve years after a drug is approved.205 Patent term limits drive divergent 
innovation: If the drug maker wants to maintain a monopoly, it needs to 
win new patents. 
Firms use differentiating innovations to extend the effective patent 
term on a drug by making minor changes to the drug’s formulation, meth-
od of delivery, or, in the most extreme cases, active ingredient (changing 
the drug but keeping market share).206 There are many, many examples.207 
In a particularly prominent case, AstraZeneca was about to lose patent 
protection on Prilosec (omeprazole), a racemic mixture of both left- and 
right-handed molecules used to treat acid reflux and related conditions.208 
AstraZeneca isolated one enantiomer (a left- or right-handed molecule)  
 
 
Jena, John E. Calfee, Edward C. Mansley & Tomas J. Philipson, ‘Me-Too’ Innovation in 
Pharmaceutical Markets, 12 F. for Health Econ. & Pol’y, Jan. 2009, at 1 (noting the lack of 
substitution from follow-on branded drugs to generics of the pioneer drug and using this to 
argue that there must be some superiority visible to doctors and patients). 
 200. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 201. Régnier, supra note 197, at 312 (finding that me-too drugs spend twenty percent 
more on marketing than pioneer drugs and that market share is related to marketing but 
not to price). 
 202. See Charles Ornstein & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Vying for Market Share, Companies 
Heavily Promote ‘Me Too’ Drugs, ProPublica (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/vying-for-market-share-companies-heavily-promote-me-too-drugs [https://perma.cc/ 
UBK9-4PY6]. 
 203. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and 
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. Health Econ. 327, 327–28 (2012). 
 204. Id. at 330 & n.10 (describing action taken by drug manufacturers to extend the 
patent lifecycle). 
 205. Id. at 337. For an exploration of how the ticking patent clock shapes pharmaceu-
tical target selection, see Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms 
Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 2044, 2044–49 (2015) (finding greater investment in drugs with shorter clinical trials). 
 206. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 203, at 328–29. 
 207. See id. at 330 (reporting that, on average, each of the 119 drugs studied has two 
patents covering ancillary components). 
 208. See Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 172, 224–25 (2016). 
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from the mixture, patented it, and got it approved as Nexium (esomepra-
zole).209 This move has been tremendously profitable, and Nexium is a 
blockbuster drug, but it seems to have minimal therapeutic benefit over 
Prilosec, even though it cost a lot to develop in terms of FDA approval and 
clinical trials, and costs a lot to buy today.210 Other strategies include chang-
ing the dosage form from twice-a-day to once-a-day (Actavis’ Namenda IR 
(memantine) to Namenda XR)211 or replacing a drug with the metabolite 
the body makes from the drug (Pfizer’s Efexor-XR (venlafaxine) to Pristiq 
(desvenlafaxine)).212 
These evergreening changes have little evidence that they help pa-
tients more than the original drugs—but they result in new patents and 
extended market protection.213 As Hazel Moir puts it: 
Was the invention of desvenlafaxine induced by the patent 
system? Almost certainly—without a further effective market 
exclusivity period, it seems unlikely that Pfizer would have devel-
oped this alternative medicine. Was there any benefit to society 
from the development of this ‘new’ medicine? . . . [A] net benefit 
in exchange for this monopoly grant is hard to perceive.214 
These changes are all examples of innovation that make a new product 
just different enough from the old product to get patent protection. The 
only real difference to patients is that they pay higher prices longer. 
* * * * 
The exact empirics of the balance between the costs and benefits of 
inventing around are uncertain and perhaps unascertainable. But at the 
least, we should recognize the costs—indeed, some already have215—and 
tally those against the baseline assumption that novelty is inherently a good 
goal for the patent system. 
 
 209. Id. at 172. 
 210. See id. at 224–25; Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Extensions 
of Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid 
Spending, 25 Health Aff. 1637, 1642–43 (2006). 
 211. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646–48 (2d Cir. 
2015); Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 208, at 198–200 (discussing the case as an example 
of the “product hopping” evergreen strategy). 
 212. See Hazel V. J. Moir, Exploring Evergreening: Insights from Two Medicines, 49 
Australian Econ. Rev. 413, 419–21 (2016). This particular technique no longer works; the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation now prevents patenting a known drug’s metabolite. See 
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For an exam-
ination of the doctrine, see generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 371 (2005). 
 213. See David F. Lehmann & Sarabeth Wojnowicz, The Evergreening of Biopharmaceuticals: 
Time to Defoliate, 56 J. Clinical Pharmacology 383, 387 (2015) (arguing that evergreening 
techniques are common but offer little benefit). But see Israel Agranat & Silvya R. Wainschtein, 
The Strategy of Enantiomer Patents of Drugs, 15 Drug Discovery Today 163, 167–69 (2010) 
(arguing that the obviousness doctrine will render many such patents invalid). 
 214. Moir, supra note 212, at 420. 
 215. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 162, at 190–91; Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation 
1, 26–29 (2016); Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 137, at 1371–72. 
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Finally, the costs of inventing around are not incurred only by the 
innovator, but also by other social institutions.216 When new drugs are devel-
oped just to avoid an existing patent, the second innovator must conduct 
clinical trials. In addition to the economic costs felt by the innovator, the 
subjects in those trials face risks of injury or foregoing better treatment 
options.217 FDA will expend resources evaluating the new drug, and those 
costs will be higher because the new drug needs to be evaluated from 
scratch rather than as a new set of information about an existing prod-
uct.218 And, as described below, generating and sharing information about 
a slightly different product spreads out the process of learning and the 
development of expertise.219 In sum, the process of inventing around to 
create something new—just to avoid an existing patent—creates its own 
costs; those costs may be offset by some benefits, but they may also be 
wasted effort. 
C. Barriers to Interoperability 
Divergent innovation can reduce the ability of products to interact 
with each other. When products interact readily, sharing standards, many 
things are easier: Consumers can switch from one vendor to another, 
replacement parts can be produced in a competitive market, and network 
effects can develop when many people use the same system.220 Systems that 
don’t work well together can raise the costs of switching from one system 
to another and thus promote lock-in.221 For biomedical technology, inter-
operability can lead to modularized system parts that can be improved 
separately.222 The ability to pass information between different systems is 
also key to many health technologies and requires interoperability.223 
 
 216. To the extent that these social costs are internalized by innovators or consumers, 
of course, this all comes out in the wash. But it is still useful to group together the initial 
source of the costs. 
 217. See generally, e.g., Kenneth J. Rothman & Karin B. Michels, The Continuing 
Unethical Use of Placebo Controls, 331 New Eng. J. Med. 394 (1994) (describing ethical 
concerns with placebo trials). Certainly, there is also a chance that the participants may 
encounter a better treatment. 
 218. Cf. Francis S. Collins, Mining for Therapeutic Gold, 10 Nature Revs. Drug Discovery 
397, 397 (2011) (noting that existing information about a drug can speed up clinical testing). 
 219. See infra section III.D. 
 220. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 
90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1896–97 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights] 
(arguing that the ability of products to interact produces many positive benefits, both in the 
marketplace and for consumers). 
 221. See, e.g., William Barnes, Myles Gartland & Martin Stack, Old Habits Die Hard: 
Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-In, 38 J. Econ. Issues 371, 371–73 (2004) (explaining 
the concept of lock-in). 
 222. Hassan Masum, Rebecca Lackman & Karen Bartleson, Developing Global Health 
Technology Standards: What Can Other Industries Teach Us?, Globalization & Health, Oct. 
2013, at 1, 2 (discussing how interoperability can lead to modularized system parts). 
 223. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 
16 Colo. Tech. L.J. 65, 66–67 (2017). 
804 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:769 
 
A rich literature addresses standards, interoperability, and intellectual 
property. One prominent strand discusses the problem of overlapping 
patent rights and the role that standard-setting organizations can play in 
reducing that problem.224 Another strand considers what happens when 
patents cover technologies essential to adhere to an industry standard.225 
This section considers a problem in some sense antecedent to both: When 
patents create incentives for innovators to pursue divergent innovation, 
they can drive a proliferation of different technologies that may be 
incompatible.226 That is to say, patent-promoted divergent innovation can 
lead to the problem that standards try to solve.227 
Wearable insulin pumps show how patent-related divergent innova-
tion can lead to interoperability problems. Insulin pumps help individuals 
with diabetes deliver insulin more easily than traditional manual injec-
tions.228 First developed in 1963,229 they are now typically small devices 
(about the size of a deck of cards) that deliver insulin through a thin tube 
to a cannula implanted in a patient.230 
Before 2001, the industry used a standard system to connect durable 
insulin pumps (which last for years) with disposable insulin sets (which last 
for a few days, contain insulin, and connect to the pumps) via “luer locks.”231 
Medtronic, the dominant maker of insulin pumps at the time, made sev-
eral types of pumps under the name MiniMed that used standard luer 
locks.232 Kits connecting to these pumps could be and were made by 
 
 224. See Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 220, at 1948–54 (discussing 
how standard-setting organizations can reduce the problem of overlapping patent rights). 
 225. See generally, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry 
Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623 (2002) (describing how conflicts arise when patent hold-
ers are involved in setting industry standards); Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces 
Impeding Interoperability?, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1943, 2004–05 (2009) (arguing that market 
forces typically overcome problems of interface patents and result in interoperability). 
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vators face an incentive not to use the standard to avoid licensing those patents. That incen-
tive may be overcome if the benefits of standardization are sufficient, but it nevertheless 
pushes toward divergence. 
 227. Bernard Chao has written about the challenge that arises when patents on inter-
faces that are no better than existing technology—what he calls “horizontal innovation”—
are used to limit interoperability, with a focus on information technology. See Bernard 
Chao, Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 287, 295–307. 
 228. Grazia Aleppo, Insulin Pump Overview: How Insulin Pumps Work, Who Benefits 
from Them, and Different Types of Pumps, EndocrineWeb (Mar. 5, 2019), https:// 
www.endocrineweb.com/guides/insulin/insulin-pump-overview [https://perma.cc/X94D-
K95F]. 
 229. Noel E. Schaeffer, Linda J. Parks, Erik T. Verhoef, Timothy S. Bailey, Alan B. Schorr, 
Trent Davis, Jean Halford & Becky Sulik, Usability and Training Differences Between Two 
Personal Insulin Pumps, 9 J. Diabetes Sci. & Tech. 221, 221 (2015). 
 230. Aleppo, supra note 228. 
 231. Medtronic Minimed Inc. v. Smiths Med. MD Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (D. Del. 
2005). 
 232. Id. at 581–82. 
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multiple vendors, including Medtronic.233 In 1999, a new market entrant 
began aggressively marketing its own luer lock–compatible insulin kits.234 
Two years later, Medtronic introduced the Paradigm line of insulin pumps, 
which use a proprietary connection system that Medtronic patented.235 
Unsurprisingly, the number of manufacturers making insulin sets compati-
ble with Medtronic pumps dropped substantially.236 Since 2001, Medtronic 
has developed multiple different insertion and connection systems with 
proprietary connections.237 For some systems, it remains the only manufac-
turer, and other diabetes manufacturers have developed their own, incom-
patible, proprietary systems.238 This divergence did not respond to some 
flaw with prior systems—even though divergent and incompatible stand-
ards have spread, many insulin pumps still use mutually compatible luer-
lock systems today,239 even as insulin sets themselves have developed new 
features.240 
Patents created an incentive to develop a system different from the 
prior art just for the sake of obtaining a patent. Medtronic was encouraged 
to engage in differentiating innovation. But the story didn’t stop there; 
once Medtronic moved away from the existing industry luer-lock standard, 
other innovators then pursued their own proprietary interface standards, 
diverging not only to pursue patent benefits but also presumably to avoid 
paying Medtronic for technologies that might infringe its new patents. The 
result was a proliferation of different incompatible systems. This incompat-
ibility comes with economic and personal costs; aside from potential 
damage to competition,241 switching between insulin pumps with different 
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 238. See, e.g., Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Justification for Single Source Awards IAW FAR 
13.106-1 (May 6, 2016), https://www.vendorportal.ecms.va.gov/FBODocumentServer/ 
DocumentServer.aspx?DocumentId=2996620&FileName=VA770-16-Q-0506-003.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) ( justifying purchasing only MiniMed infusion sets for users 
of MiniMed insulin pumps and only Animas infusion sets for users of Animas insulin 
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 239. Infusion Set Comparison, Diabetesnet.com (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.diabetesnet.com/ 
diabetes-technology/infusion-sets [https://perma.cc/K9UP-RSMA]. 
 240. See, e.g., Up Close with BD’s New Infusion Set: A Much Needed Improvement to 
Insulin Pumps, diaTribe Learn (May 18, 2015), https://diatribe.org/close-bd-new-infusion-
set-much-needed-innovation-improve-insulin-pumps [https://perma.cc/W6LV-SNX3]. 
 241. Competitive harms suggest that such patent-prompted interoperability can some-
times raise antitrust concerns. Indeed, Smiths made exactly such an argument but failed. 
Medtronic, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 584–85. This argument was made with greater success in C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., in which a company changed the design of a biopsy gun to accept 
a new and different needle design, patented the new needle and the needle-gun interface, 
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connectors can require patient retraining and increase the risk of medical 
error.242 
D. Problems of Shallow Learning and Spread Expertise 
Finally, divergent innovation decreases the depth of knowledge ac-
quired and available about particular innovative products. Zachary Liskow 
and Quentin Karpilow describe a broader pattern of innovation: Innova-
tion is easier when knowledge stocks are concentrated, allowing future 
innovators to exploit a basis of existing expertise.243 When innovations 
diverge—driven by patent law doctrine or by other factors—we should 
expect to see shallower knowledge stocks relevant to those innovations. 
There are certainly benefits from broader knowledge; as elsewhere in this 
story, tradeoffs exist. But decreased depth of knowledge comes with sub-
stantial costs. This section illustrates the problem of dispersed knowledge 
with two examples: the EpiPen and the market for epinephrine auto-
injectors, and me-too statins. 
1. Dispersed User Knowledge. — Consider the EpiPen, which illustrates 
the problem of divergent innovation leading to diffused patient know-
ledge and increased switching costs. The EpiPen, owned by Mylan and 
manufactured by Pfizer, is an epinephrine auto-injector used to treat aller-
gic reactions, including anaphylaxis, which can lead to shock, suffocation, 
and death.244 It is a relatively simple device, including a fixed dose of 
epinephrine, a needle, a spring, and a plastic housing including a retracta-
ble cap for the needle.245 And epinephrine itself has been a generic drug 
for decades.246 Nevertheless, the EpiPen itself has seen little improvement.247 
 
and reduced competition in the market through its patents. 157 F.3d 1340, 1367–72 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 242. See Lutz Heinemann & Lars Krinelke, Insulin Infusion Sets: The Achilles Heel of 
Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Infusion, 6 J. Diabetes Sci. & Tech. 954, 960–61 (2012). 
 243. Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 387, 404–14 (2017) (discussing knowledge stocks and innovation path de-
pendency in the context of clean energy technology). As noted above, the depth of existing 
knowledge stocks and expertise can also have implications for the nonobviousness and 
enablement doctrines; when more knowledge and understanding are available in a partic-
ular technological area, the PHOSITA is likely enabled to do more without undue experi-
mentation, which also raises the bar for nonobvious innovations. Thus, these doctrines are 
cyclically related to the social problem of shallow knowledge; nonobviousness pushes toward 
divergent innovation, which then results in decreasing knowledge stocks and broadens the 
set of potential innovations which are considered nonobvious. See supra sections II.A.2–.3; 
see also Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 84, at 1648–51 (noting the relationship 
between knowledge in the art, enablement, and nonobviousness). 
 244. See Meghana Keshavan, 5 Reasons Why No One Has Built a Better EpiPen, STAT 
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/09/epipen-lack-of-innovation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/G28Q-SFRQ]. 
 245. See id; see also EpiPen, Drugs.com, https://www.drugs.com/epipen-auto-injector.html 
 [https://perma.cc/7TE8-E3AZ] (last updated Jan. 4, 2019). 
 246. See Keshavan, supra note 244. 
 247. See id. 
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Competitor innovation has mostly been divergent innovation, which has 
been largely unsuccessful in reaching patients and has imposed costs when 
it has because patients don’t know how to safely use the different auto-
injectors available.248 
Competitors with the EpiPen have pursued divergent innovation to 
avoid infringing the patents protecting it.249 Five related patents protect 
the EpiPen, all expiring in 2025.250 The key element in the EpiPen auto-
injector is a safety cap that surrounds the needle when the device is not in 
use, automatically retracts when the device is jabbed against the thigh, and 
then automatically returns to guard the needle and protect the user 
against needle-sticks after use.251 The patents around this key design fea-
ture drive divergent innovation: As an auto-injector innovation consultant 
put it, “It would not be very difficult to create an EpiPen product, in terms 
of engineering . . . . It’s not rocket science. It’s purely the patent that stops 
us.”252 
The Adrenaclick, the closest competitor, is just a little bit different 
than the EpiPen: a path of differentiating innovation. It has two safety caps 
instead of one, and does not have an automatic shield that guards the 
needle after use.253 The differences are minor, and certainly not improve-
ments; it is hard to see a reason for them besides avoiding the EpiPen 
patents, especially since the Adrenaclick was developed well after the 
EpiPen.254 Another competitor has tried to tread this path even closer: 
 
 248. See id.; see also Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of EpiPen, 
Became a Virtual Monopoly, Wash. Post (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 249. I do not claim that patents create the only incentives for product differentiation, 
just that they create at least some incentives for such differentiation. 
 250. See U.S. Patent No. 7,449,012; U.S. Patent No. 7,794,432; U.S. Patent No. 8,048,035; 
U.S. Patent No. 8,870,827; U.S. Patent No. 9,586,010; see also Orange Book: Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N019430, 
FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001& 
Appl_No=019430&Appl_type=N [https://perma.cc/Z525-5KRN] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) 
(listing the patents granted for the EpiPen). 
 251. See How to Use an EpiPen, Mylan, https://www.epipen.com/-/media/files/epipen/ 
howtouseepipenautoinjector.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H5U-UMG2] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). 
 252. See Keshavan, supra note 244 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthew 
Allen, head of drug delivery for Cambridge Consultants). 
 253. How to Use Adrenaclick (Epinephrine Injection, USP Auto-Injector), Adrenaclick, 
http://adrenaclick.com/how_to_use_adrenaclick_epinephrine_injection_USP_auto_injec
tor.php [https://perma.cc/55Y2-VEW9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
 254. The Adrenaclick was introduced in 2010. Adrenaclick Auto-Injector Launched for 
Anaphylaxis, MPR (Jan. 7, 2010), https://www.empr.com/home/news/adrenaclick-auto-
injector-launched-for-anaphylaxis/ [https://perma.cc/69TE-59HG]. It is covered by one 
patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,905,352, which expires in 2027. See Orange Book: Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N020800, 
FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=003& 
Appl_No=020800&Appl_type=N [https://perma.cc/Q8UV-5P33] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) 
(listing the patents for Adrenaclick). 
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Teva sought approval to market a generic version of the EpiPen—but 
Teva’s version had both a safety clip at one end and a removable cap 
covering the needle end, in another effort to design around Mylan’s pa-
tents but still make a device that could substitute for the EpiPen.255 
The Auvi-Q, the third and final epinephrine auto-injector available in 
the United States, pursued a path of exploring innovation, and is quite 
different. In addition to a different form factor (the Adrenaclick and EpiPen 
are both cylinders, while the Auvi-Q is shaped like a pack of playing cards), 
the Auvi-Q uses a needle that automatically extends and retracts and uses 
an electronic voice instruction system to guide patients.256 It also has a 
single safety cap.257 The Auvi-Q’s substantial differences are reflected in its 
larger patent portfolio; the Orange Book lists twenty-six patents covering 
the Auvi-Q, the last of which expires in 2029.258 
Slightly different technologies can create high switching costs through 
decreased knowledge and the need for retraining. Although the differ-
ences between the EpiPen, Adrenaclick, and Auvi-Q are not especially 
large, they matter a great deal to patients—especially children—who use 
them in high-stress emergency situations. For example, the EpiPen re-
quires users to remove one cap and the Adrenaclick requires users to 
remove two caps; inadequate training can result in confusion, possibly 
leading to mistakes that could result in injury or death.259 Unsurprisingly, 
users—especially parents of children with allergies—do not wish to make 
even small changes in using the devices. This desire to avoid the risk and 
uncertainty associated with differentiating technological change can mani-
fest in policy. Summer camps, for instance, may require that parents pro-
vide the EpiPen—and not a different epinephrine auto-injector—because 
they only train camp counselors on one type of auto-injector to avoid 
confusion.260 
 
 255. Michael Gibney, Could EpiPen’s Plastic Cap Be Mylan’s Secret Weapon?, FiercePharma 
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.fiercepharma.com/drug-delivery/could-a-plastic-cap-epipen-
have-given-mylan-its-market-dominance [https://perma.cc/688X-UM6A]; see also Adam 
Rubenfire, Mylan’s Fight Against Teva Highlights Logjam Created by FDA Petitions, Modern 
Healthcare (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160902/NEWS/ 
160909983/mylan-s-fight-against-teva-highlights-logjam-created-by-fda-petitions [https:// 
perma.cc/Q248-ZR2J]. 
 256. See About Auvi-Q, Auvi-Q, https://www.auvi-q.com/about-auvi-q [https://perma.cc/ 
D6PK-32BN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N201739, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/ 
cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=003&Appl_No=201739&Appl_type=N [https:// 
perma.cc/J53T-82VM] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (listing patents for Auvi-Q). 
 259. Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%? Because They Could, 
Forbes (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywillingham/2016/08/21/why-
did-mylan-hike-epipen-prices-400-because-they-could/ [https://perma.cc/TW8F-4PX6]. 
 260. Anna Edney, The U.S. Is Facing an EpiPen Shortage, Bloomberg (May 8, 2018) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-08/patients-can-t-find-epipen-at-the-
pharmacy-as-supply-runs-short (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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FDA seems to have recognized the switching costs and the danger of 
variety. When Teva filed its application to market a generic EpiPen, Mylan 
filed a citizen petition requesting FDA to deny the application on the 
grounds that the design difference (one cap versus two) would be unsafe 
for device users.261 FDA denied Mylan’s citizen petition262—but then re-
jected Teva’s generic application all the same, citing “certain [unspecified] 
major deficiencies.”263 Eventually, after public outcry over EpiPen costs 
and efforts by FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, FDA approved Teva’s two-
cap version.264 
Shallow knowledge for divergent innovations—patients not knowing 
much about the Adrenaclick or Auvi-Q—can also limit competition among 
different products. The EpiPen has long been the hugely dominant mar-
ket leader.265 Its market leadership has resulted from several factors, 
including allegedly anticompetitive conduct,266 but bolstering them has 
been the fact that once you start using the EpiPen, the costs of switching 
are high. And Mylan—smartly—has created an extensive program of pro-
viding free or discount EpiPens to schools (in contracts that limit schools’ 
purchases of competitive devices) so that consumers develop knowledge 
about the EpiPen and not its competitors.267 
Information-based limits on competition limit the benefits from 
divergent innovation. Costs stay high; the EpiPen’s price went up over 
 
 261. Citizen Petition from Frank Casty, Head Glob. Med. Affairs, Mylan, to Div. of Dockets 
Mgmt., FDA 3 (Jan. 16, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/ 
005-LifeSciences/mylancitizenpetition1.16.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4BF-MRSX]. Mylan 
filed a supplemental report claiming that users trained on the EpiPen could not use the 
proposed device safely. Citizen Petition Supplement from Frank Casty, Head Glob. Med. Affairs, 
Mylan, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/ 
assets/pdf/CH10683591.PDF [https://perma.cc/YL49-SGD3]. Others questioned the qual-
ity of the report. Ed Silverman, How Mylan Tried to Keep Teva from Selling a Generic 
EpiPen, STAT (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/08/31/mylan-
teva-generic-epipen/ [https://perma.cc/Z7MJ-26NL]. 
 262. Kieran Meagher, Note, Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Mylan’s Ability to 
Monopolize Reflects Major Weaknesses, 11 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 589, 603 (2016). 
 263. See Carly Helfand, FDA Swats Down Teva’s EpiPen Copy, Putting Mylan in Cruise 
Control, FiercePharma (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-and-marketing/ 
fda-swats-down-teva-s-epipen-copy-putting-mylan-cruise-control [https://perma.cc/LHU6-
NGYW]. 
 264. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves First Generic Version of EpiPen (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-generic-version-
epipen [https://perma.cc/UG5V-UPPV] [hereinafter FDA, Generic Version of EpiPen]. 
 265. See generally Carrier & Minniti, supra note 20 (describing EpiPen’s dominance 
and the tactics underlying that dominance). 
 266. See generally id. 
 267. See Pauline Bartolone, EpiPen’s Dominance Driven by Competitor’s Stumbles and 
Tragic Deaths, NPR (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/ 
07/492964464/epipen-s-dominance-driven-by-competitors-stumbles-and-tragic-deaths 
[https://perma.cc/Q9E3-NG8J]. 
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400% in seven years, resulting in outcry and Congressional hearings268 
(which didn’t impact its price).269 A second problem arises when the sole 
source runs into manufacturing problems; EpiPen manufacturing prob-
lems led to shortages in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States in 2018.270 
Of course, one version of this story goes that this is exactly what patents 
are supposed to do. EpiPen has a patent on its technology; it gets some-
thing like a monopoly; it makes a lot of money; and that ex post reward is 
what motivates the ex ante research that goes into developing a lifesaving 
technology. We wait for the patent to expire, and everyone is better off. Of 
course, this story poses problems for the EpiPen.271 But that’s not the point 
I’m making here. The story of the EpiPen demonstrates how the classical 
narrative of market selection for superior devices can provide an inade-
quate description of real innovation and market dynamics.272 In particular, 
divergent innovation, whether differentiating or exploring, can create 
substantial costs for consumers because of shallow information, incompat-
ibility, and switching costs among otherwise substitutable products. These 
costs, moreover, can lead to an absence of market competition and the 
absence of even the putative benefits of innovative divergence. 
More generally, product variety means that users are less likely to 
know how to use any particular product and more likely to encounter costs 
when switching from more familiar to less familiar. This may be the case 
for patients, as with the EpiPen and its competitors, or for providers, who 
may know less about each individual drug available for prescription, and 
who may face decision costs when choosing between options. 
2. Spread Knowledge. — Shallow knowledge doesn’t only afflict con-
sumers; providers and drug-makers alike can face problems from shallow 
knowledge, as the case of me-too drugs demonstrates.273 When different 
 
 268. Katie Thomas, Mylan’s Chief Is Chastised by Lawmakers Questioning EpiPen 
Pricing, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/mylan- 
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 269. Charles Duhigg, Outcry Over EpiPen Prices Hasn’t Made Them Lower, N.Y. Times 
(June 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/business/angry-about-epipen-prices- 
executive-dont-care-much.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 270. Edney, supra note 260. 
 271. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 20, at 55–56 (recounting the manufacturing and 
distribution history of the EpiPen and noting Mylan’s near monopoly on the market); id. at 
59–71 (describing Mylan’s anticompetitive actions in the fields of patent litigation settle-
ments, FDA citizen petitions, and exclusive contracts with schools); Keshavan, supra note 
244 (summarizing the technological, financial, and regulatory incentives against improving 
the EpiPen); Katie Thomas, Mylan to Settle EpiPen Overpricing Case for $465 Million, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/business/epipen-mylan-justice- 
department-settlement.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the federal 
government’s concerns about Mylan allegedly misclassifying the EpiPen as a generic and 
overcharging Medicaid). 
 272. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra section III.B.1. 
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me-too drugs are developed, each drug requires clinical trials for approv-
al,274 broadening the set of class-related clinical trials but resulting in less 
information gathered about each individual drug. To the extent that real-
world data are collected based on ongoing drug use in the context of a 
learning health system, dispersed use of different statins also ensures that 
we learn relatively less about any one drug.275 And when providers are 
choosing whether to prescribe a new statin, they must rely on the limited 
set of information generated in clinical trials, rather than whatever infor-
mation has been gathered through years of clinical practice and adverse 
event reporting.276 
Having multiple drugs available does have benefits. Competition can 
reduce prices (though as discussed above, this price reduction is lim-
ited).277 Learning how different patients respond to different drugs can 
lead to more precise medical practice.278 And there may be benefits to 
having a broader armamentarium of drugs available for treatment—
though this argument is weakened by evidence that providers rarely use 
the breadth of that armamentarium, perhaps because of information and 
familiarity concerns.279 
Overall, whether related to knowledge, interoperability, or inventing-
around costs, divergent innovation creates costs that counterbalance at 
least some of its benefits. These costs are especially worrisome when diver-
gent benefits are limited; the next Part discusses how different incentives 
for biomedical innovation can limit the potential upside of divergent 
innovation. 
 
 274. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012). 
 275. See W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 Minn. 
L. Rev. 2413, 2414, 2437–45 (2018) [hereinafter Price, Drug Approval] (describing the pro-
cess of collecting data about drugs in learning health systems to allow for deeper learning 
about drugs in clinical care). 
 276. Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 712. 
 277. See supra notes 197–202 and accompanying text. 
 278. See, Price, Drug Approval, supra note 275, at 2433–34 (“[C]linical trials, with their 
inherent limits, simply don’t provide all the information the health system needs to provide 
the best care.”). 
 279. See Peter C. Austin, Muhammad M. Mamdani & David N. Juurlink, How Many “Me-
Too” Drugs Are Enough? The Case of Physician Preferences for Specific Statins, 40 Ann. 
Pharmacotherapy 1047, 1048 (2006) (finding that in a large sample of Ontario doctors, the 
average doctor wrote 94.9% of prescriptions for just one or two statins; thus half of all 
doctors only ever prescribed one or two). For some diseases, like psychiatric conditions or 
HIV/AIDS, this argument holds more force. See, e.g., HIV Drug Resistance, Avert (Oct. 10, 
2019), https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-programming/treatment/drug-resistance 
[https://perma.cc/HDR9-64PV] (describing the threat of HIV drug resistance partially 
caused by providers continuing to prescribe a less effective treatment regimen); Mental 
Health Medications, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/ 
mental-health-medications/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/VN6G-6Z7Y] (last updated Oct. 
2016) (describing different kinds of psychiatric medication and the need to try multiple 
variations to find a drug with manageable side effects for effective treatment). 
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IV. PATENT DIVERGENCE IN CONTEXT 
Patents act in context. Innovation incentives do not exist in a vacuum. 
For biomedical technologies, in particular, a wide set of additional incen-
tive mechanisms shape the direction of innovation. Grants create funding 
for research,280 FDA-administered data or market exclusivity give addi-
tional protection for drugs or biologics,281 prizes create ex post rewards set 
by prize administrators rather than the market,282 and reimbursement 
policies shape how the market pays—or doesn’t—for biomedical technolo-
gies.283 These different incentives can also push innovation to diverge, or 
not. Biomedical innovation is not unique in this regard; other innovation 
fields have their own incentive landscapes. A full canvassing of the influ-
ences of different innovation incentives awaits future work, but the next 
sections discuss two key mechanisms to illustrate how other incentives can 
interact with patent law’s incentives for divergent innovation: FDA ap-
proval and insurer reimbursement. 
A. FDA Approval 
Most biomedical technologies require FDA approval to be marketed 
and sold,284 and the approval process can be extremely expensive. Esti-
mates of the cost of winning FDA approval for a new drug range widely 
and are contested but are typically thought to be at least several hundred 
 
 280. See generally Price, Grants, supra note 14 (describing the role of grants in funding 
research). 
 281. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Role of the FDA, supra note 76, at 359–64 (explaining FDA 
“pseudo-patents”); Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 299, 336–
53 (2015) (surveying FDA’s competition-limiting practices). Because these FDA-administered 
exclusivity periods are greatest for new chemical entities and new biologics—that is, for new 
products, not new uses for old products—these periods, too, create incentives for pursuing 
divergent innovation over deepening innovation. See Heled, supra, at 341, 351. But see 
Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 91, 103–20 (2016) 
(arguing that data exclusivity is the wrong framing). 
 282. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the 
Debate, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 999, 1001–07 (2014) [hereinafter Roin, Intellectual Property] 
(reviewing the literature on prize systems). Prizes, while of substantial theoretical interest to 
innovation law scholars, are relatively small in terms of dollars at stake. See Price, Grants, 
supra note 14, at 3 (describing how governments spend far more on grants than on prizes). 
 283. See Roin, Intellectual Property, supra note 282, at 1040–41; Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing 
Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 153, 
178–93 (2016) [hereinafter Sachs, Prizing Insurance]. 
 284. A notable exception is the category of laboratory-developed tests, which are diagnos-
tics developed and administered in a single laboratory. Laboratory Developed Tests, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/laboratory-developed-tests [https:// 
perma.cc/R92X-WPXY] (last updated Sept. 29, 2018). 
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million dollars.285 Approval for a new biologic is similarly expensive.286 
Approval for new medical devices (those that require premarket approval) 
is less expensive but still costs millions of dollars.287 Unsurprisingly, approv-
al costs are a substantial hurdle in developing a new technology.288 In a 
way, these costs reflect an FDA requirement for deepening innovation by 
requiring substantial data about the functioning, safety, and efficacy of a 
chemical that was patented for a particular use long before. Nevertheless, 
the process is exceedingly costly. The possibility of avoiding these substan-
tial approval costs can thus create substantial incentives for innovation.289 
Some FDA approval or clearance pathways drive divergent innovation 
like patent law does. FDA has programs that reduce the regulatory burden 
of approval for drugs that fill unmet medical needs: Fast Track and 
Accelerated Approval.290 These programs create incentives for drug devel-
opers to pursue exploring innovation. Easier review can also come with 
the demonstration of significant improvement over existing technology 
through the Breakthrough Therapy or Priority Review pathways.291 A 
Breakthrough Device category similarly eases the regulatory burden for 
devices when either there is no existing approved or cleared treatment, or 
the new device offers “significant advantages.”292 On the other hand, FDA 
might also prioritize improvement and review purely me-too drugs more 
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 286. See infra section IV.A.2. 
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Michael Mezher & Zachary Brennan, Regulatory Explainer: Everything You Need to Know 
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(last updated Feb. 23, 2018). 
 291. See id. 
 292. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3051(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1121–
22 (2016). 
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closely for safety problems if they offer no clinical improvement, though 
its general standard is safety and efficacy, not comparative improvement.293 
FDA also has pathways that create powerful incentives for firms to 
avoid divergent innovation. This section considers two: (1) the premarket 
clearance and approval pathways for medical devices and (2) the biosimi-
lar approval process. 
1. Getting Medical Devices on the Market. — FDA allows some medical 
devices onto the market through abbreviated processes that discourage 
divergent innovation. FDA classifies all medical devices into one of three 
regulatory control categories (I, II, or III) based on their level of risk and 
complexity.294 Class I devices are subject to general controls that are appli-
cable to all devices; Class II devices require more assurance of safety and 
effectiveness because general controls, by themselves, are insufficient; Class 
III devices present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are 
subject to premarket approval to assure safety and effectiveness.295 
The 510(k) premarket clearance process aims to streamline FDA’s 
regulatory scheme. When devices are neither so high-risk as to require pre-
market approval nor so low-risk as to be exempted from premarket clear-
ance or approval requirements, they can undergo the 510(k) clearance 
process.296 Under this process, FDA evaluates whether a device is “substan-
tially equivalent” to a legally marketed Class II predicate device.297 
In contrast to the premarket approval process, which directly requires 
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, “substantial equiva-
lence” is a comparative standard. It requires that “the device has the same 
intended use as the predicate device” and either (a) the device “has the 
same technological characteristics as the predicate device,” or (b) if the 
new device has different technological characteristics, information298 sub-
mitted by the device sponsor “demonstrates that the device is as safe and 
effective as a legally marketed device, and . . . does not raise different 
 
 293. See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/fdas-drug-review-process-ensuring- 
drugs-are-safe-and-effective [https://perma.cc/6DZG-8P82] (last updated Nov. 24, 2017). 
 294. See FDA, The 510(k) Program: Evaluating Substantial Equivalence in Premarket 
Notifications [510(k)]: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff 2 
(2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/82395/download (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter FDA, Substantial Equivalence Guidance]. 
 295. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012). 
 296. FDA, Substantial Equivalence Guidance, supra note 294, at 2–4. 
 297. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i). There is also a de novo classification process, which allows 
sponsors to seek lower-risk classifications even when there is no substantially equivalent 
predicate device that would permit using the 510(k) pathway. De Novo Classification Request, 
FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/de-novo-classification-
request [https://perma.cc/W8E2-4RZS] (last updated Sept. 6, 2019). 
 298. This information may include “appropriate clinical or scientific data if deemed 
necessary.” 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii)(I). 
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questions of safety and effectiveness than the predicate device.”299 FDA 
may clear devices under the 510(k) pathway even if they are different enough 
that they may be independently patented, but they must still be close 
enough for FDA to find them substantially equivalent. 
The 510(k) pathway is substantially cheaper than the premarket approv-
al pathway. On average, firms spend $94 million taking a device through 
the premarket approval pathway ($75 million on the FDA process itself), 
and $31 million to take a device through the 510(k) pathway ($24 million 
at FDA).300 The premarket approval pathway is also longer than the 510(k) 
pathway; it typically takes over 400 days,301 compared with around 200 days 
for a 510(k) preclearance.302 
Thus, as Lisa Suter and colleagues argue, “Since [510(k)] regulatory 
approval hinges on claims of similarity to previously approved devices, the 
process may encourage the development of devices that provide only small 
improvements at higher cost than their predecessors.”303 Because the 
510(k) preclearance process is so much cheaper, and requires that devices 
be substantially equivalent to existing devices, the overall FDA approval 
process creates substantial incentives for firms to diverge less from existing 
medical device technologies.304 
 
 299. Id. at § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The 510(k) clearance pathway has defied advocate 
arguments that it should be eliminated. See, e.g., Gregory D. Curfman & Rita F. Redberg, 
Medical Devices—Balancing Innovation and Regulation, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 975, 976–77 
(2011); IOM Says Get Rid of 510k Approval FDA Responds Not So Fast, U.S. Med. (Jan. 10, 
2012), http://www.usmedicine.com/hhs-and-usphs/fda/iom-says-get-rid-of-510k-approval-
fda-responds-not-so-fast [https://perma.cc/N74T-UNH2]. Instead, FDA is looking to imple-
ment more thorough post-market surveillance. Scott Gottlieb, Advancing Policies to Promote 
Safe, Effective MedTech Innovation, FDA (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/ 
fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-experts/advancing-policies-promote-safe-effective- 
medtech-innovation [https://perma.cc/LJ9E-SRLE] (describing new reforms that involve 
monitoring and follow-up studies). 
 300. Josh Makower, Aabed Meer & Lyn Denend, FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Technology 
Innovation: A Survey of Over 200 Medical Technology Companies 7 (2010), https://www.advamed.org/ 
sites/default/files/resource/30_10_11_10_2010_Study_CAgenda_makowerreportfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BQY7-WUE2]. 
 301. Elaine Silvestrini, Premarket Approval (PMA), Drugwatch, https://www.drugwatch.com/ 
fda/premarket-approval [https://perma.cc/G4SA-5LAU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
 302. Emergo, How Long It Takes the US FDA to Clear Medical Devices Via the 510(k) 
Process 5 (2017), https://www.emergogroup.com/sites/default/files/emergo-fda-510k-data- 
analysis-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/58TE-YKSP]. 
 303. Lisa G. Suter, A. David Paltiel, Benjamin N. Rome, Daniel H. Solomon, Ilya Golovaty, 
Hanna Gerlovin, Jeffrey N. Katz & Elena Losina, Medical Device Innovation—Is “Better” 
Good Enough?, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 1464, 1464 (2011). 
 304. See Richard Williams, Robert Graboyes & Adam Thierer, US Medical Devices: Choices 
and Consequences 13 (2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Williams-Medical-
Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5H2-S77V] (explaining why a manufacturer would make 
products similar to existing ones to use the 510(k) process); Kyle M. Fargen, Donald Frei, 
David Fiorella, Cameron G. McDougall, Philip M. Meyers, Joshua A. Hirsch & J. Mocco, The 
FDA Approval Process for Medical Devices: An Inherently Flawed System or a Valuable 
Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. NeuroInterventional Surgery 269, 271 (2013) (“A Premarketing 
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Not all medical devices are approved through standard device proce-
dures; combination devices that contain both a drug and a device may be 
approved instead through a drug approval process, such as a New Drug 
Application or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).305 Epi-
nephrine auto-injectors, described above, are such combination devices.306 
FDA has noted the need for similarity for those devices should they seek 
approval through the shorter, cheaper ANDA: If the product is used by 
patients independently, especially in emergency situations (like auto-
injectors), FDA will ask whether patients can safely switch to the generic 
“without retraining by a physician or health care professional.”307 This 
pathway therefore offers cheaper, more expeditious device approval to 
devices that hew very closely to existing technology. Teva tried, and failed, 
to bring a generic version of the EpiPen, slightly modified to avoid patent 
infringement, to market through exactly this process.308 
2. The Biosimilar Approval Pathway. — FDA’s pathway for biosimilar 
approval also creates incentives for firms to stray less from existing technol-
ogy, partially undermining patent incentives for divergent innovation.309 
Biologics are a class of therapeutics, often proteins, produced by living 
cells and then purified.310 The biosimilar pathway aims to encourage firms 
to develop products that are nearly copies of existing biologics to increase 
competition and decrease prices.311 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), passed 
as part of the Affordable Care Act, creates a pathway whereby firms can 
 
Notification (510(k)) is a fast-track process wherein applicants must demonstrate that the 
device to be marketed (moderate risk or Class II) is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a pre-
existing legally-marketed device (predicate) in terms of safety and effectiveness.”); see also 
Keshavan, supra note 244 (citing Matthew Allen, head of drug delivery for Cambridge 
Consultants, for his claim that FDA “rules keep consumers safe [b]ut . . . also make it diffi-
cult to come up with design that can meet the standards—without infringing on Mylan’s 
patent”). 
 305. See, e.g., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, Comparative Analyses and 
Related Comparative Use Human Factors Studies for a Drug-Device Combination Product 
Submitted in an ANDA: Draft Guidance for Industry 1 n.2, 4–5 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/ 
media/102349/download [https://perma.cc/Z3SB-Y4WQ] (describing supporting data 
needed to file for an ANDA for a combination device). 
 306. FDA, Generic Version of EpiPen, supra note 264. 
 307. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., FDA Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, to 
Thomas K. Rogers, III, Exec. Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, King Pharmaceuticals 6 
(July 29, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0128-0006 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 308. See Rubenfire, supra note 255; supra section III.D.1. 
 309. One may quibble with whether there is actually “innovation” going on here—are 
the follow-on companies actually innovating or just copying something that already exists? 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the biosimilar pathway explicitly and deliberately pushes 
some companies to pursue development pathways that diverge not at all from prior prod-
ucts, it counteracts some of the incentives created by patent law’s premium on divergence. 
 310. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics 
Competition and Innovation, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1023, 1032–33 (2016). 
 311. See id. at 1028–29. 
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develop approximate copies of biologics and pursue a more streamlined 
approval pathway.312 Current technology does not allow exact copies of 
biologics; they are too complicated for the tools we have available.313 The 
BPCIA therefore creates an easier path for companies to win approval for 
biologics that are very similar to existing biologics (thus, “biosimilars”).314 
The biosimilar approval pathway offers substantial savings: Biosimilar 
approval costs around $100–250 million, while approval for an innovator 
biologic costs around $1 billion or more.315 The pathway is also shorter 
and less risky because FDA and the biosimilar company both know that the 
innovator biologic actually works.316 Although the biosimilar pathway does 
not permit marketing while patents protect the original biologic, firms 
develop biosimilars while those patents are still in force, waiting to market 
them either until the patents expire, are invalidated through litigation, or 
are licensed.317 
This pathway for biosimilar approval creates incentives for firms to 
avoid divergent innovation. If firms pursue versions of biologics that al-
ready exist, they face lower development costs, lower risk, and an easier 
pathway to approval. These incentives may counterbalance the patent 
incentives to pursue differentiating or exploring innovations—though in 
some cases, both incentives can be relevant, as when firms develop biosimi-
lars that are close enough to follow the FDA biosimilar approval pathway 
 
 312. See id. at 1040–42. 
 313. See id. at 1034–37 (noting the lack of available tools for precisely identifying and 
copying the characteristics of biologics); id. at 1039 (noting the regulatory incentives for 
innovator firms to avoid developing the fundamental knowledge to be able to characterize 
biologics fully). 
 314. Id. at 1040. 
 315. Id. at 1049; see also Thomas Sullivan, A Tough Road: Cost to Develop One New 
Drug Is $2.6 Billion; Approval Rate for Drugs Entering Clinical Development Is Less Than 
12%, Pol’y & Med. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.policymed.com/2014/12/a-tough-road-
cost-to-develop-one-new-drug-is-26-billion-approval-rate-for-drugs-entering-clinical-de.html 
[https://perma.cc/YUJ5-YEL4]. 
 316. Note that the pathway still has substantial problems, including the possibility that 
trade secrets about manufacturing processes will substantially limit innovation. See Price & 
Rai, supra note 310, at 1046–48 (describing this dynamic generally); W. Nicholson Price II, 
Regulating Secrecy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1769, 1791–92 (2016) (describing the interactions 
between trade secrecy and tight regulatory definitions that make the former especially pow-
erful in this context). 
 317. The BPCIA includes elaborate patent-related provisions. See Erika Hanson, Biosimilars, 
Shall We Do the Patent Dance?, U. Utah S.J. Quinney C.L. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://law.utah. 
edu/biosimilars-shall-we-do-the-patent-dance [https://perma.cc/F3TN-YY8E] (“The patent 
dance will begin when the manufacturer of a biosimilar submits an application with 
[FDA] . . . . The two parties then go back and forth on which patents are infringed upon . . . 
[allowing them] to litigate the patent infringement issues before the biosimilar is on the 
market.”); see also Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1670–72, 1674–76 (2017) (de-
scribing the so-called “patent dance” and holding it not enforceable by injunction under 
the terms of the BPCIA itself). Companies developing biosimilars are immunized from 
patent infringement liability for activities related to seeking eventual FDA approval under 
the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). 
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but, for instance, use a slightly different manufacturing process to avoid 
patents held by the original biologic developer.318 Overall, these proce-
dures reduce incentives for divergent biomedical innovation. 
B. Reimbursement 
Insurance reimbursement procedures can similarly create incentives 
against divergent innovation in biomedical technologies. This section fo-
cuses on the basics of reimbursement for medical devices.319 In essence, it 
is often easier to obtain coverage for products that are similar to devices 
already covered by insurers. This may be because payers are already famil-
iar with the technology, so that knowledge acquisition is easier, or it may 
simply be because administrative barriers to payment have already been 
surmounted by an earlier product.320 
The process of obtaining reimbursement for a new medical product 
is not trivial. New products need to be assigned a “code,” which is used by 
providers to indicate which product is being used and how it should be 
reimbursed.321 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)322 
 
 318. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research & Ctr. for Drug Biologics Evaluation & 
Research, FDA, Development of Therapeutic Protein Biosimilars: Comparative Analytical 
Assessment and Other Quality-Related Considerations 11–12 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/ 
media/125484/download [https://perma.cc/C5UJ-BDWM] (describing application require-
ments for differing manufacturing processes for biosimilar biologics). Duplicating manufac-
turing methods is challenging, and many aspects are held as trade secrets instead of patents, 
compounding that difficulty. See Price & Rai, supra note 310, at 1046–48. However, in those 
instances when manufacturing methods patents do exist, those patents are sometimes easier 
to enforce against biosimilar applicants under the “patent dance” provisions of the BPCIA, 
which allow the original biologic sponsor to examine the biosimilar applicant’s application, 
including manufacturing methods, to evaluate potential patent infringement. See id. at 
1053–54. But see Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1664, 1676 (finding that the disclosure of a biosimilar 
application in the “patent dance” is optional under the BPCIA). 
 319. Drug reimbursement has its own complications, including the existence of true 
generic products, automatic substitution, tiered formularies, pharmacy benefit managers, 
and mandates to cover certain types of drugs. For an introduction to some of the mechanics 
of drug reimbursement, see Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 
2307, 2311–21 (2018) [hereinafter Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement] (describing linkages 
between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement); Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 
283, 178–93 (describing reimbursement and arguing it should be used as an innovation 
policy lever). 
 320. See Marcia Nusgart, HCPCS Coding: An Integral Part of Your Reimbursement 
Strategy, 2 Advances in Wound Care 576, 578 (2013) (explaining how substantially equiv-
alent devices may be placed on the same HCPCS code). 
 321. See Tiffini Diage, NAMSA, Planning for Successful Medical Device Reimbursement: 
So Your Device Is Cleared, Now What? 3–4 (2015), https://www.namsa.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/10/NAMSA-Planning-for-Successful-Medical-Device-Reimbursement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XPG-TKPE] (“Coding is the language of CMS, private payers, facilities, 
and physicians. Coding translates into payment. Without a proper code, procedures and 
products are not paid for.”); Fee for Service, HealthCare.gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
glossary/fee-for-service/ [https://perma.cc/SJ6N-JL5G] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 322. I focus on CMS in this section, but private insurers typically follow CMS’s lead. See 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Innovators’ Guide to Navigating Medicare 7 (2015), 
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relies on codes to process reimbursement and to set rates; for instance, the 
Level II Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System identifies durable 
medical equipment used outside physician’s offices, among other things.323 
If a technology is relatively similar to an existing product, then it can 
sometimes just use the existing code, which requires relatively little effort 
or risk.324 If the new technology is further afield, though, getting reim-
bursement can require requesting that CMS modify the code, or create an 
entirely new code for the new technology.325 But this process often fails—
in 2017, CMS approved only three of ten requests for code modifications 
for medical devices and only ten of seventy-two requests for new codes for 
medical devices.326 Even when the process is successful, it typically takes at 
least a year.327 Industry actors have formally complained to the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services about the difficulty of getting new codes 
created.328 
Obtaining a code does not guarantee reimbursement; the developer 
of a new technology must also obtain a favorable coverage determination.329 
Coverage determinations, whether “local” or national, request that 
Medicare provide “the formal instruction to the Medicare claims processing 
contractors regarding how to process claims (e.g., when to pay, when not 
to pay, pay only when certain clinical conditions are met).”330 For an item 
to be eligible for coverage, it must be within the categories of established 
benefits, not specifically excluded from coverage, and “reasonable and 
necessary.”331 Coverage determinations also consider whether the device is 
a breakthrough technology or medically beneficial and available when 
other medically beneficial alternatives are not available or covered by 
Medicare.332 Coverage determinations can thus promote divergence, if no 
other product is available or if the new product uses a different clinical 
 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/CouncilonTechInnov/Downloads/Innovators-
Guide-Master-7-23-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4T9-FSU4] [hereinafter Innovators’ Guide]. 
 323. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Healthcare Common Procedure Coding 
System (HCPCS) Level II Coding Procedures 1 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Coding/MedHCPCSGenInfo/Downloads/2018-11-30-HCPCS-Level2-Coding-Procedure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EZD3-ZZBA] [hereinafter Coding Procedures]. 
 324. See Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 4. 
 325. See id. at 16–18 (describing the creation of new codes). 
 326. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Level II Coding Decisions for the 2017–
2018 Coding Cycle (2018), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/MedHCPCSGenInfo/ 
Downloads/2017-2018-HCPCS-Coding-Decisions.zip (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 327. Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 5. 
 328. E-mail from All. for HCPCS II Coding Reform to Tom Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. & Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 
15, 2017), https://www.aahd.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/HCPCSCodingReform 
Medicare082017letterHHS.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3CB-YB8B]. 
 329. Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 3–4, 16. 
 330. Id. at 13. 
 331. Id. at 11. 
 332. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124, 
31,125 (proposed May 16, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405). 
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modality. But convincing the Medicare Administrative Contractors that 
make local coverage determinations means demonstrating that the new 
technology works and is “reasonable and necessary”—and that process is 
easiest when the new technology is not too far from what the clinicians 
already know.333 
Sometimes, the incentives against substantial difference are even 
more obvious. According to a 1984 report by the Office of Technology 
Assessment, when the Veterans Administration set standards for wheel-
chairs that it would buy, it historically wrote them “with a specific wheel-
chair in mind, usually an Everest & Jennings, Inc. (E&J) model.”334 Other 
manufacturers that wanted “to obtain VA contracts may have [needed] to 
make products similar to the E&J wheelchair” because “products were 
often evaluated on the basis of how closely they conformed to E&J’s 
model.”335 
Thus, getting reimbursement—like winning FDA approval—can 
create incentives for innovators to avoid more divergent technological 
approaches.336 This pattern does not always hold—truly breakthrough 
technologies are specifically recognized as appropriate for coverage 
determinations, and when an innovator does get a new code, the innovator 
may be able to negotiate higher reimbursement rates for the new technol-
ogy, with no pricing anchor of rates set for an older technology.337 But the 
most straightforward path to obtaining a code and coverage, minimizing 
 
 333. See Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making National Coverage Determinations, 
78 Fed. Reg. 48,164, 48,164–65 (Aug. 7, 2013) (“NCDs serve as generally applicable rules to 
ensure that similar claims for items or services are covered in the same manner.”). 
 334. Donald S. Shepard & Sarita L. Karen, The Market for Wheelchairs: Innovations 
and Federal Policy 27 (1984), https://ota.fas.org/reports/8418.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EY4G-5DEX]. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Manufacturers may also deprioritize significant differences as a way to avoid lia-
bility in the presence of third-party payers who are less performance sensitive. Christopher 
Buccafusco, Disability and Design, N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 19–22), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3497902 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (mak-
ing this point in the context of motorized wheelchairs). 
 337. One trade magazine explains the issue this way: 
If your product is placed in a HCPCS code that does not include similar 
products with similar manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRPs), 
then the reimbursement established for it by the payer could be inappro-
priate and thus, not be prescribed or used. For instance, if the retail price 
for your surgical dressing is $25.00 and the HCPCS code that was assigned 
to your product had a Medicare reimbursement amount of $17.00, it may 
be likely that a supplier may choose a different company’s product to 
purchase that is closer to or less than $17.00. Thus, this HCPCS code may 
not be appropriate for the product, since the reimbursement rate is not 
adequate and including it in this code would not allow patient access to 
your product. 
Nusgart, supra note 320, at 577–78. 
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at least procedural costs, is to follow fairly closely the technologies that 
have gone before and avoid divergent innovation. 
C. Interactions 
Incentives for and against divergent innovation can interact in prob-
lematic ways, and biomedical innovation is rich with examples. Patent law 
pushes toward divergent innovation—either differentiating innovation or, 
if the nonobviousness requirement works well, exploring innovation. On 
the other hand, FDA and reimbursement incentives can push against 
divergent innovation, driving innovators to hew closely to existing technol-
ogy. Figure 2 shows these counteracting incentives. The result can be an 
unhappy middle in which firms spend resources on minor variations,338 
building parallel but shallow knowledge bases, and creating interoperabil-
ity problems—bringing all the costs of divergence but only limited benefits 
from technological advances. 
FIGURE 2: IMPACTS OF PATENT, FDA, AND INSURANCE  
INCENTIVES ON INNOVATION339 
Slightly different medical devices follow this pattern. Patent law 
pushes inventors to make medical devices different from each other so 
 
 338. See Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: 
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement, 
66 SMU L. Rev. 59, 78–82 (2013); Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of 
Follow-On Biologics, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 9, 26–30 (2012) (discussing this type of dynamic 
in the drug and biologic contexts). 
 339. Novelty promotes differentiating or exploring innovation, and nonobviousness 
furthers exploring innovation when it works well—but the arrow for nonobviousness fades 
to mirror its relative weakness in biomedical innovation. FDA approval and insurance reim-
bursement both create incentives for less-divergent innovation—that is, for differentiating 
rather than exploring innovation. 
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that they can receive patent protection.340 But receiving FDA approval is 
far less costly through the 510(k) pathway if the inventor can demonstrate 
that the resulting product is substantially equivalent to an already-
approved product—that is, if the innovation is closer to differentiating 
innovation than exploring innovation.341 Similarly, receiving reimburse-
ment approval from insurance companies is substantially easier if the new 
device can be reimbursed under an existing code rather than requiring 
the development and approval of a new code.342 The result can easily be 
differentiating innovation that doesn’t advance the field but creates sub-
stantial costs. 
The point isn’t that drugs or other biomedical technologies pursued 
through divergent innovation are never going to work, or are never going 
to be better than earlier products—of course some are. Divergent innova-
tion can and does lead to great advances. But patent law can create incen-
tives to pursue divergent innovation even if it doesn’t lead to great 
advances—even if it’s not expected to lead to any advance at all. 
Sometimes, with biomedical technologies, it doesn’t even matter 
whether a new technology works better or not. Vinay Prasad and col-
leagues make this point generally.343 They argue that the way cancer drugs 
are regulated and reimbursed in the United States, with relatively low 
standards for approval and high reimbursement rates, means that 
“[e]mbarking on unpromising trials agendas that involve testing margin-
ally effective or even ineffective drugs, is now potentially profitable . . . 
because the reward for even one rare successful trial generates enough 
revenue to support the costs of all the failures.”344 Essentially, “new for the 
sake of new” is enough to make money; better doesn’t matter very much. 
In many circumstances, we know that it doesn’t matter whether a new 
biomedical technology is better than earlier technologies for a rather 
simple, if depressing, reason: No one bothers to find out. If innovators 
were especially concerned with how a new technology surpassed an old 
technology, we would expect to see extensive studies demonstrating that 
superiority. Wouldn’t drug companies want to show their new drugs are 
superior? But for many biomedical technologies, we have no such evi-
dence.345 FDA requires only evidence of safety and efficacy, although some 
 
 340. See supra Part II. 
 341. See supra section IV.A.1; see also Fargen et al., supra note 304, at 272 (noting “the 
financial incentive for manufacturers to develop new devices via the 510(k) clearance pro-
cess with only minor improvements”). 
 342. See supra section IV.B. 
 343. See generally Vinay Prasad, Christopher McCabe & Sham Mailankody, Low-Value 
Approvals and High Prices Might Incentivize Ineffective Drug Development, 15 Nature Revs. 
Clinical Oncology 399, 399 (2018) (describing how ineffective drugs can prove profitable). 
 344. Id. 
 345. See, e.g., Harvey V. Fineberg, Foreword to Comm. on Comparative Effectiveness 
Research Prioritization, Inst. of Medicine, Initial National Priorities for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, at xiii (2009), https://www.multiplechronicconditions.org/assets/pdf/ 
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have argued that approving me-too drugs should require a demonstration 
of superiority.346 Comparative effectiveness research, which explicitly deter-
mines which of multiple interventions works better, is still relatively rare; 
when it does happen, especially in the United States, it is largely pursued 
by government or nonprofit actors.347 Drug developers, it seems, are more 
worried about the possibility that their product might be inferior than they 
are driven by the possibility of showing that their products are superior—
a showing they demonstrably do not need for market success.348 
V. INTERVENTIONS 
This Essay has argued both a broader and a narrower point. On the 
broad side, divergent innovation, driven in part by the patent system, 
comes with a set of costs, including shallower knowledge, compatibility 
problems, and the costs of inventing around. These costs should be part 
of the calculus that policymakers undertake or academics explore when 
considering how to use policy levers to shape ongoing innovation. It is 
hard to know ex ante the right combination of deepening, differentiating, 
and exploring innovation. But getting the right balance from a policy 
standpoint is exceptionally hard if policymakers and academics leave out 
a key piece of the picture. 
On the narrow side, biomedical innovation faces a special set of chal-
lenges: Combining patent law’s incentives for divergent innovation with 
FDA and insurance reimbursement incentives against divergence can lead 
to differentiating innovation that involves many of the costs of divergence 
with few of its benefits (in particular, those that might arise from exploring 
innovation). The broader issue demands less a solution than an acknowl-
edgement and ongoing attention. But the narrower issue—costly differ-
entiating innovations in biomedical innovation—could be addressed by 
more targeted policy interventions. This section does not try to explore 
these interventions exhaustively; any one could be the subject of its own 
 
Comparative%20Effectiveness%20Research/iom-cer-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG9B-A94W] 
(“[F]or want of appropriate studies, innumerable practical decisions facing patients and 
doctors every day do not rest on a solid foundation . . . about what constitutes the best choice 
of care.”). 
 346. See, e.g., Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 712 (calling for FDA to require 
superiority for approval once a generic exists in a drug class). 
 347. See, e.g., Institute for Clinical & Economic Review, http://www.icer-review.org 
[https://perma.cc/7QVE-5KEB] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg 
& W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & 
Biosciences 3, 16–18 (2017) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side] (describing the 
possibility and desirability of comparative effectiveness research by insurers and other 
health payers and noting the relative scarcity of such efforts); id. at 44–45 (describing the 
establishment of the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct comparative 
effectiveness research). 
 348. See Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side, supra note 347, at 18. 
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Essay. Instead, this section briefly canvasses four possibilities: two within 
the patent system and two outside it. 
A. Inside the Patent System 
Within the patent system, two potential areas of doctrine suggest pos-
sibilities for change: nonobviousness, in which biomedical technologies 
encounter lower bars to patentability than other areas, and utility, which 
across the board has no requirement for market superiority or desirabil-
ity—but which could. 
1. Nonobviousness. — Nonobviousness doctrine provides a lever to 
promote exploring innovation over differentiating innovation. Theoreti-
cally, it should reduce incentives for much differentiating innovation by 
denying patents to the resulting inventions. Nevertheless, as described 
above, the nonobviousness requirement applies less strongly to biophar-
maceutical innovation than elsewhere.349 
Tightening nonobviousness doctrine in the fields of biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals could encourage more exploring innovation in those 
fields. A first step would be abandoning rigid “lead compound analysis”350 
to accept the more flexible approach to nonobviousness reiterated by the 
Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex.351 Being more willing to follow an 
“obvious-to-try” analysis—that is, asking whether compounds were within 
the realm of what medicinal chemists would be likely to try—would also 
raise the threshold of nonobviousness.352 To be sure, contemporary non-
obviousness doctrine has its own challenges, including difficulty in 
administration.353 And increasing the nonobviousness threshold wouldn’t 
directly create incentives for exploring innovation. But it would reduce the 
patent-provided incentives for differentiating innovation while leaving 
them intact for exploring innovation, making the latter a more attractive 
approach. 
Raising the nonobviousness bar isn’t an uncontroversial solution for 
biopharmaceutical innovation.354 An obvious response,355 drawing on the 
 
 349. See supra section II.A.2. 
 350. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
 351. 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
 352. See Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 402, 407 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s unwillingness to apply “obvious-to-try” logic). 
 353. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness: A Comment on Three 
Learned Papers, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 431, 433–37 (2008) (summarizing and extending 
scholars’ takes on the indeterminacy of the obviousness requirement); Daralyn J. Durie & 
Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 989, 990 (2008) (“It is also perhaps the most vexing doctrine to apply, in significant 
part because the ultimate question of obviousness has an ‘I know it when I see it’ quality 
that is hard to break down into objective elements.”). 
 354. Notably, since the difference in nonobviousness is less stark when applied to med-
ical devices, the doctrine provides less of an opportunity for positive change there. 
 355. Ha! 
2020] COST OF NOVELTY 825 
work of Benjamin Roin, is that novelty and nonobviousness both already 
do too much to limit the field of available drugs for pharmaceutical 
development.356 Roin would prefer more deepening innovation of the type 
that patent law does not reward now: research on known compounds to 
demonstrate that they really work as drugs.357 Raising the nonobviousness 
threshold would cut in the opposite direction, improving one problem 
(relatively high incentives for unhelpful differentiating innovation) but 
not another (absent incentives for deepening invention). The absence of 
incentives for deepening innovation cuts at the heart of the newness 
driving the patent system and would require either substantial revamping 
of patent law358 or turning to other incentives to address.359 
Better enforcing the on-the-books doctrinal requirement of nonob-
viousness would help to ensure that the new drugs we get are really 
different, which helps address at least some of the problems described 
above.360 Nonobviousness can only be a partial lever because, among other 
things, it largely focuses on technical difficulty rather than social benefits 
or outcomes, which are the results of greater concern in this Essay.361 
2. Utility. — Utility doctrine provides another potential avenue for 
reform within the patent system. If part of the problem is that we want 
better but we get new, maybe patentability should require superiority.362 
 
 356. Roin, Upatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 505. 
 357. See id. at 541–42. 
 358. See generally, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based 
on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 672 (2014); Sichelman, supra note 37 (proposing 
commercialization patents). 
 359. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Debate, supra note 41, at 375–81 
(arguing for combining innovation policy levers); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at 41–63 
(describing ways grants can be deployed as a useful innovation incentive). 
 360. One might worry that me-too drugs have some use in reducing prices, or that drugs 
with minor technical differences might have substantially different results, and that a 
strengthened obviousness requirement might limit their development too much. In 
response, one could imagine an obviousness-type double-patenting bar that applies within 
a class of drugs. Under such an approach, me-too drugs could still be patented—but their 
patent term would expire (with a terminal disclaimer) at the same time as the first-in-class 
drug. The contours of such an approach would need some thought to work out in detail 
and are beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally Douglas L. Rogers, Double Patenting: 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. 317 (2017) (analyzing pharmaceutical double patents). Thanks to Mark Lemley for 
this suggestion. 
 361. See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 109, at 812 (describing nonobvi-
ousness as measuring technical achievement). Commercial success is a secondary indicium 
of nonobviousness. See id. at 823–28 (describing the commercial success factor); id. at 842–
52 (criticizing the use of commercial success). But as described above, commercial success 
is only a weak indication that a biomedical technology is worthwhile. See supra notes 11–12 
and accompanying text. 
 362. For a contrary view, see Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra note 107, at 1071–
80 (arguing that the utility requirement should be abolished wholesale). 
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Perhaps utility could get us there—should we just overrule Justice Story in 
Lowell v. Lewis?363 
Probably not. There is a reason that patent law doesn’t require more 
than that an invention have some use (and even the practical utility require-
ment as it exists now is controversial).364 The basic idea that the market 
should determine which inventions are worthwhile and which are not is 
mostly right—as long as there is a market that actually performs that role. 
The problem with biomedical inventions and the utility requirement is 
that the market doesn’t work very well, for many reasons we’ve seen, to 
perform that function. FDA review helps; it evaluates whether a biomedi-
cal invention works at all, a task that the market is especially bad at accom-
plishing, and that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court recognized 
should lie with FDA and not the utility doctrine.365 But neither FDA nor 
the market does a good job letting purchasers decide which biomedical 
innovations are better. 
Nevertheless, that dynamic doesn’t hold as well in other markets, where 
Justice Story’s logic is more powerful and we can rely more heavily on 
consumers and other purchasers to ensure that better technology wins out.366 
And patent law is (mostly) technology-neutral, so that raising the utility 
bar would also impact other industries and create problems.367 As dis-
cussed above, it’s also quite difficult to know and to evaluate utility at the 
time of patent filing.368 Changing utility, while a prima facie attractive solu-
tion to the problem of innovations that are not actually better, is unlikely 
to work in practice. 
 
 363. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 364. Timing issues are also problematic, though potential solutions exist. See supra 
section II.A.3. 
 365. See In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 257–58 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (rejecting the Patent 
Office’s requirements for evidence of safety in human trials as a condition of patentability 
because such a requirement is committed to FDA); Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra 
note 107, at 1058 (discussing the case’s place in the evolution of the utility requirement). 
 366. Naturally, this doesn’t always work, and history is littered with discarded Betamax 
tapes describing technologically superior innovations that nonetheless lost in the market. 
And, as Risch describes, the costs of worthless patents merely existing (and thus their value) 
can be large. Risch, supra note 106, at 1224–28; see also Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson 
Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio and Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 
773, 776 (2014) (arguing that patent assertion entities are likely to become more active in 
the biopharmaceutical space). 
 367. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 84, at 1576–77 (“In theory, then, we 
have a uniform patent system that provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of 
innovation.”). But see id. at 1577 (“In practice the rules actually applied to different indus-
tries increasingly diverge.”). The utility doctrine in particular has more bite in biomedical 
innovations than in other technological areas. Id. at 1645–46. But the difference is that it 
already applies more strongly in those areas because of the nature of biomedical research 
and the desire to patent inventions especially early. Requiring even greater utility just for 
biomedical innovations would be a substantial step further. 
 368. See supra section II.A.3. 
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B. Outside the Patent System 
A separate set of interventions could involve law outside the patent 
system. FDA regulation and insurer reimbursement cause problematic 
interactions with patent incentives, but each of those areas also provides 
possible points of intervention.369 In general, interventions to improve the 
market for health technology could bring us closer to Story’s story of market-
places solving the problem of worthless (or at least not better) technolo-
gies.370 There are many ways this could work; two illustrative avenues for 
change involve altering how FDA regulation and insurer reimbursement 
work for biomedical innovation. 
1. FDA Approval. — FDA exerts pressure toward differentiating inter-
vention, and it does so in a way that makes sense: It is easier to evaluate a 
technology if the technology is familiar. There is a reason the 510(k) path-
way exists; FDA’s regulatory knowledge is cumulative just like innovation 
can be. Trying to increase regulatory burdens when easier paths are 
available would be counterproductive, especially in an area already known 
for high regulatory overhead. 
But we could imagine an approach in which FDA required that new 
technologies demonstrate improvement over old technologies in the same 
class in order to be approved. For instance, before approving a new statin, 
FDA might require its sponsor to demonstrate its superiority to existing 
approved statins. This would likely push innovators toward exploring inno-
vation, or at least away from difference solely for the sake of difference. 
Such an intervention would face substantial challenges. First, FDA 
probably lacks the statutory authority to institute superiority requirements 
for approval.371 Second, implementing a requirement for superiority would 
be quite complex and would create additional uncertainty in the drug 
development process, since improvement is often unknown until later in 
 
 369. This is not a complete list of possible interventions, which could span many areas 
of law and policy. Grants, for example, could be used to provide resources for the devel-
opment of deepening innovation about drug manufacturing or new uses for old drugs, or 
to develop infrastructural resources to make that sort of research easier. See, e.g., Price, 
Grants, supra note 14, at 42–49, 59–63; cf.  Price & Rai, supra note 310, at 1056–59 (describ-
ing government-led efforts to increase innovation in biologics manufacturing technology). 
 370. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 371. I say “probably” because the agency has historically been creative about finding 
statutory authority for its initiatives, and even before gaining the authority in 1962 to 
evaluate drugs for efficacy, FDA routinely folded efficacy into the requirement that new 
drugs be safe. See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and 
Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA 115–16, 120–21 & n.3 (Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter 
& Theda Skocpol eds., 2014). Similarly, one could imagine FDA folding “improvement” into 
the concept of “efficacy” or “safety,” perhaps because existing drugs have known safety 
profiles and some improvement would be needed to justify the uncertainty of a new therapy. 
That imagining is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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that process and can be difficult to define operationally.372 Third and 
finally, this type of approach goes rather strongly against the current (con-
troversial) zeitgeist of getting FDA out of the business of telling patients 
which technologies they can and can’t access once they’ve been demon-
strated to be safe.373 
An intermediate and more feasible approach could borrow from the 
interaction between patent law and FDA and help resolve the timing prob-
lem in utility mentioned above. For instance, enforcing patents on drugs 
could require a certification from FDA that the drug be clinically superior 
to earlier approved products in the class. Dmitry Karshtedt has suggested 
an approach along these lines in the limited context of product-hopping, 
arguing that comparative effectiveness research data either be added to a 
drug’s labeling (or replaced by the fact that the company couldn’t be both-
ered to generate such data),374 or that listing of a patent in the Orange 
Book—which confers quite a bit of power on the patent—be dependent 
on such a showing.375 This approach would create incentives to demon-
strate superiority, ensuring that divergent innovation brings the benefit of 
progress. This regime would have the benefit that nonsuperior drugs 
could still be approved and available on the market—they just would not 
receive the additional ex post exclusivity (and hence, ex ante incentives) 
provided by the patent system. In fact, FDA already plays a parallel role for 
biologics, which cannot receive FDA-mediated market exclusivity if they 
are variants of another approved biologic unless the sponsor demonstrates 
that the variation is an improvement.376 Extending this treatment to the 
patent system by tying enforcement to FDA review for improvement pro-
vides an intriguing possibility for reducing some of the costs of divergent 
innovation. 
2. Payer Reimbursement. — Finally, although fixing the market for 
health technologies generally would be a heavy lift,377 we could inspire health 
 
 372. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug 
Modifications, and the FDA, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1129, 1192–94 (2019) (describing the difficulty 
of measuring improvements in drug safety and effectiveness). 
 373. See Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right 
to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (allowing the use of exper-
imental drugs by certain patients); Holly Fernandez Lynch, Patricia J. Zettler & Ameet 
Sarpatwari, Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320 
JAMA 869, 869–70 (2018) (offering suggestions for implementing the Act); Patricia J. Zettler, 
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 Ind. L.J. 845, 881–85 (2017) (describing right-to-try laws 
generally). 
 374. Karshtedt, supra note 372, at 1194–98. 
 375. Id. at 1202–05. 
 376. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii) (2012) (stating that FDA-enforced data and market-
ing exclusivity are not available for any later application by the biologic sponsor that covers 
certain nonstructural modifications or structural modifications “that do[] not result in a 
change in safety, purity, or potency”). 
 377. See Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription 
Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 2273, 2288–98 (2018) 
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insurers and other payers to encourage innovation to be better, rather 
than new.378 Again, it makes sense that administrative hurdles are higher 
to win approval for exploring innovations than differentiating innovation; 
insurers, too, become familiar with existing technology. To make those 
hurdles worth overcoming—that is, to move away from the unhappy medi-
um of differentiating innovation—payers would need to tie reimburse-
ment more closely to performance. Payers could refuse to pay (or to pay 
more) for technologies unless the new technology presents a demonstra-
ble improvement over existing technologies. 
That payers in general don’t already do this more is something of a 
mystery, and reflects some of the market perversities in health care: 
patients demand specific drugs; the “consumer” is split between payers, 
patients, and doctors; and costs can be passed around between different 
actors.379 That Medicare specifically doesn’t take comparative effectiveness 
into account when making coverage decisions is much less surprising; CMS 
faces strict legal limits on how it can use such research.380 Similarly, CMS is 
limited in how it can price drugs. Medicare Part D plans (the plans that 
cover outpatient prescription drugs) are administered by contractors, and 
the government is prohibited from centrally negotiating drug prices, leav-
ing the task to those individual Medicare Part D plan administrators.381 
But not everywhere follows this path. Payers in many other countries 
do demand comparative-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness data before 
agreeing to pay for new biomedical technologies, sometimes limiting new 
therapies to the prices of existing therapies (or refusing to pay for them) 
if no additional clinical benefit is shown.382 U.S. payers could follow suit. 
 
(describing the market factors contributing to the problems with fixing prescription drug 
prices in the United States). 
 378. To the extent that payers defray the individual impact of costs that are artificially 
high because of the novelty-promoting incentives of patent law, they may already help to 
reduce allocative inefficiencies created by those incentives, even if other novelty costs 
continue. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 
Yale L.J. 544, 559–63, 593–601 (2019) (describing the potential disconnect between innova-
tion incentives and allocative inefficiencies and offering policy mechanisms, including 
subsidies, to address the latter). 
 379. Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side, supra note 347, at 26–39 (describing legal and 
economic hurdles that prevent payers from playing a “a larger role in healthcare innova-
tion”); see also Mello, supra note 377, at 2288–98 (describing market factors and perverse 
incentives in the pharmaceutical market); Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, supra note 
319, at 2311–21 (explaining the link between FDA approval and CMS reimbursement and 
that private insurers often follow the lead of public payers). 
 380. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1 (2012) (prohibiting CMS from establishing a dollar-per-quality-
adjusted-life-year threshold for coverage and creating other limitations). 
 381. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i); see also Mello, supra note 377, at 2299–300 (describing 
these dynamics). 
 382. See, e.g., Ariel D. Stern, Felicitas Pietrulla, Annika Herr, Aaron S. Kesselheim & 
Ameet Sarpatwari, The Impact of Price Regulation on the Availability of New Drugs in 
Germany, 38 Health Aff. 1182, 1182–83 (2019) (summarizing a German law that limits new 
drug prices based on an assessment of their clinical benefit); What We Do, Nat’l Inst. for 
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Growing efforts at value-based pricing for pharmaceuticals are in this 
vein.383 Even Medicare leaves some room for this. Medicare Part D plans 
must cover all drugs within six protected classes—but outside those classes 
they must cover only two drugs per class, leaving room for choice based on 
real effectiveness.384 Nevertheless, Medicare drug pricing rules complicate 
efforts to move forward, though the specifics are outside the scope of this 
Essay.385 In Germany, where prices for new drugs are limited if the drugs 
fail to show clinical improvement over existing therapies, drugs without 
such improvement were much more likely to leave the market than drugs 
that really made a difference, and in any case, they weren’t reimbursed at 
a premium relative to older therapies.386 And it turns out that many new 
drugs did not, in fact, show improvement.387 If U.S. payers—Medicare or 
not—more widely refused to pay or pay more for new therapies that were 
just new-for-the-sake-of-new and not actually better, incentives to develop 
such therapies would decrease. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law promotes new, different technology, and that is generally 
seen as a good thing. But it is not only good. There is a dark side to novelty. 
When patent law pushes inventors across the board to diverge from what 
has come before, society faces costs from that divergence, ranging from 
the effort of inventing around to the problem of systems that are not 
interoperable to the decrease of expertise. These costs may at times exceed 
the benefits created by novel technologies—but patent law does not take 
this point into consideration. Perhaps it shouldn’t—but we should. When 
setting innovation policy, policymakers should recognize that patent law 
will drive unbridled novelty. 
 
Health & Care Excellence, https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/ 
6P9L-RZ2G] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (describing a U.K. organization that determines 
pricing and access to new health technologies). 
 383. See Leemore S. Dafny, Christopher J. Ody & Matthew A. Schmitt, Undermining 
Value-Based Purchasing—Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 
2013, 2013–15 (2016) (describing industry strategies for resisting value-based purchasing); 
Anna Kaltenboeck & Peter B. Bach, Value-Based Pricing for Drugs: Theme and Variations, 
319 JAMA 2165, 2165–66 (2018) (describing different forms of value-based pricing); Elizabeth 
Seeley, Susan Chimonas & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Outcomes-Based Pharmaceutical 
Contracts Reduce Drug Prices in the US? A Mixed Methods Assessment, 46 J.L. Med. & 
Ethics 952, 958–59 (2018) (finding mixed evidence of success in value-based pricing and 
noting CMS’s apparent willingness to pursue value-based pricing strategies). 
 384. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(vi) (2018). 
 385. See generally Rachel Sachs, Nicholas Bagley & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Innovative 
Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & 
L. 5 (2018) (describing this interaction). 
 386. Stern et al., supra note 382, at 1185. 
 387. Beate Wieseler, Natalie McGauran & Thomas Kaiser, New Drugs: Where Did We 
Go Wrong and What Can We Do Better?, 366 BMJ 1, 2 (2019). 
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Policymakers should also recognize that, for biomedical innovation in 
particular, patent law’s incentives for divergence fit within a complex 
ecosystem of other incentives that may push innovation not to diverge—
with sometimes problematic results. Two of those other incentives, FDA 
approval and insurer reimbursement, are particularly salient in the con-
text of biomedical technology. Considering how these different incentives 
work together to shape the development of new technology is a complex 
but crucial task that demands continuing scholarly attention. 
One potential avenue for future work within the biomedical sphere 
would question the temporal effect of different incentives for and against 
divergent innovation. Some incentives are clustered around the beginning 
of the research process; grants and publications are typically more relevant 
to basic research and early-stage work. Other incentives tend to occur 
later—reimbursement questions and FDA approval arise once a technol-
ogy has already been developed (though, of course, savvy developers 
should be thinking of these issues very early in the development process, 
and at least some are). Patents come into play somewhere in the middle, 
though their influence stretches across the development process. Notably, 
all three of the earlier incentives are at least partially oriented toward 
divergent innovation, and both later incentives promote divergent innova-
tion. Does this timeline make sense for innovation, or does it stunt the 
growth and adoption of new biomedical technologies? 
An orthogonal set of inquiries would look more deeply into divergent 
innovation in industries outside biomedicine. This piece has laid out a 
framework for patent law’s promotion of divergent innovation and has ex-
plored in depth the costs of such divergence in the biomedical context—
as well as some complicating factors from other incentives. Other fields are 
different. 
While a full exploration of differences between fields with respect to 
divergent innovation must await future work, a few points come to mind. 
First, the relative strength of patents in providing incentives for divergent 
innovation will be different in other industries. Information technology, 
for instance, tends to move much faster than biomedicine, and much 
faster than patent life cycles; divergent innovation may be driven more by 
product differentiation theories than patent law.388 For many types of soft-
ware, patents are likely unavailable under recent § 101 subject-matter 
jurisprudence.389 In nonbiomedical fields in which patents are important, 
the nonobviousness requirement’s comparatively greater strength (relative 
 
 388. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of 
Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech 
Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571 (2009) (discussing litigation behavior in high-tech patents); 
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 30 (discussing software patents). 
 389. See Laura R. Ford, Patenting the Social: Alice, Abstraction, & Functionalism in 
Software Patent Claims, 14 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 259, 304–16 (2016) (discussing 
recent patentable subject matter cases with respect to computers and software). 
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to pharmaceuticals) should push for more exploring over differentiating 
innovation.390 
Second and relatedly, markets hopefully work better outside the health 
technology sector. Most goods are not credence goods, and in most mar-
kets the consumer is a single entity rather than a doctor/patient/insurer 
hybrid. Where markets function better, they should be able to discipline 
unhelpful and nonimproving divergent innovation, giving more truth to 
Justice Story’s admonition in Lowell v. Lewis.391 If consumers can easily 
identify inferior products (or nonsuperior but higher-priced products) 
and avoid them, patents on those products will not provide much incentive 
for innovation. 
Third, however, to reiterate this Essay’s broader argument, the exist-
ence and types of divergent innovation costs are generalizable across 
technologies, even if the examples given here are biomedical. Inventing 
around, lack of interoperability, and shallow knowledge/spread expertise 
are technology-agnostic. The cost of working around others’ patents is the 
entire rationale behind the (contested but voluminous) literature on 
patent hold-up, which occurs more frequently in nonbiomedical indus-
tries.392 Patented, incompatible electronic connections limit interoperabil-
ity between different systems.393 And anyone who has had to shift from one 
software platform to another, and found everything irritatingly different, 
knows firsthand the issue of nontransferable expertise. 
Fourth and finally, different industries will face different intersecting 
nonpatent regimes. FDA does not regulate (most) software, and insurance 
reimbursement is typically not an issue for consumer goods. Thus, the 
intersection highlighted here, and its unhappy medium of new-for-the-
sake-of-new differentiating innovation, may be a less frequent outcome in 
different fields. But other regimes may play parallel roles, whether they be 
regulators, such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Federal 
Aviation Agency in pesticides and airplanes, or procurement systems with 
their own limits, such as the Department of Defense for military technol-
ogy. Again, the specifics must await future work. 
More generally, questions of deepening, differentiating, and explor-
ing innovation could apply across creative fields beyond technological 
innovation. Intellectual property privileges what is new and different—
even in instances in which consumers may or may not benefit from that 
 
 390. See supra section II.A.2 (discussing nonobviousness, including in the pharma-
ceutical context). 
 391. See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
 392. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich. Telecomm. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 1, 9–20 (2014) (laying out the hold-up theory). But see id. at 20–26 (describing 
an alternate perspective); id. at 30–34 (critiquing the hold-up theory). 
 393. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 225, at 1965–69 (discussing patented and 
incompatible interfaces in videogames, voice over IP, and early modem technologies). 
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newness.394 Like the intellectual property system’s reliance on price to set 
rewards, and on exclusivity to implicitly determine what can be protected, 
its prioritization of difference shapes the kind of knowledge and creative 
effort that creators put forth. Across various contexts, we should take into 
account the costs of divergence and consider how we can drive the crea-
tion that is not just new—but also deeper and better. 
  
 
 394. See, e.g., Buccafusco et al., supra note 22, at 41–46 (describing different consumer 
tastes for novelty in different creative fields). Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1441, 1472–74 (2010) (describing relatively easy 
acceptance of substantially new technologies in science), with id. at 1479–83 (describing 
that in creative arts, successful works are typically not too different from what has come 
before). 
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